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1349 
TOWARDS AN INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE OF 
IMPRISONMENT FOR LEGAL FINANCIAL 
OBLIGATION NONPAYMENT IN WASHINGTON STATE 
Devon King 
Abstract: Imprisonment for debt is resurfacing in the United States, primarily in the form 
of contempt proceedings for failure to pay court judgments. Although Washington’s 
Constitution prohibits imprisonment for debt, the State repeatedly jails individuals for failing 
to pay legal financial obligations. This Comment explores the adverse consequences of this 
de facto debtors’ prison system, describes the strong prohibition on imprisonment for debt 
found in article I, section 17 of the Washington Constitution, and argues that imprisonment 
for failing to pay legal financial obligations violates that strong prohibition. It then discusses 
how case law has degraded article I, section 17, making systemic constitutional challenges to 
the practice impractical. This Comment attempts to provide litigants with a comprehensive 
overview of strategies that can be used to challenge the current jurisprudence and the validity 
of imprisoning individuals for failing to pay legal financial obligations. 
INTRODUCTION 
Jane Doe
1
 is going back to jail. Years ago, Jane was incarcerated for a 
felony offense committed in Washington State. She left prison owing the 
state $2500 in Legal Financial Obligations (“LFOs”).2 Although she 
fully intended to satisfy her LFO debts as soon as possible, Jane faced 
serious difficulties reintegrating into society. She was unable to secure 
gainful employment after losing her job for being unable to work while 
incarcerated.
3
 She had a hard time securing steady housing and had 
                                                     
1. Jane is a hypothetical, statistically average low-income felony offender in Washington State. 
2. Two thousand, five-hundred dollars of LFO debt upon release (including restitution) is just 
below the average assessment in Washington State. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF WASH. & 
COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS: THE WAYS COURT-IMPOSED DEBTS 
PUNISH PEOPLE FOR BEING POOR 3 (2014), available at https://acluwa.org/sites/default/files/ 
attachments/Modern%20Day%20Debtor%27s%20Prison%20Final%20%283%29.pdf [hereinafter 
MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS] (“The average amount of LFOs imposed in a felony case is 
$2540.”); KATHERINE BECKETT ET AL., THE ASSESSMENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF LFOS IN 
WASHINGTON STATE 15 (2008) (report prepared for the Washington State Minority Justice 
Commission). 
3. See BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 4; MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS, supra note 2 
(“[U]p to 60% of former inmates remain unemployed one year after release from prison.”); Alicia 
Bannon et al., Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 27–28 
(2010), http://brennan.3cdn.net/c610802495d901dac3_76m6vqhpy.pdf (noting that because 
employment background checks are increasingly including credit checks, LFO debts can both 
hinder job prospects and serve as a “back-door” method for employers to identify individuals with 
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barely begun to confront the social costs arising from state custody.
4
 The 
deterioration of her social supports, combined with the economic costs 
of reentry, as well as costs imposed by the state made her situation bleak 
indeed. Ironically, the cost of her past incarceration is the very thing that 
is sending her back to jail. Since her first release, she has paid ten dollars 
per month without fail toward her account—a typical minimum payment 
expected of low-income felons.
5
 Despite adhering to her self-imposed 
payment schedule, yearly interest and surcharges have nearly tripled her 
LFO debts in ten years: 
 
Year Amount 
Reduced
6
 
Amount 
Increased
7
 
Total Owed 
at Year End
8
 
0
9
 $0 $2500
10
 $2500 
1 $120 $385.60 $2765.60 
2 $120 $431.87 $3077.47 
3 $120 $454.89 $3412.36 
4 $120 $495.08 $3787.44 
5 $120 $540.09 $4207.53 
6 $120 $590.50 $4678.03 
7 $120 $646.96 $5204.99 
8 $120 $710.20 $5795.19 
9 $120 $781.02 $6456.21 
10 $120 $760.35 $7096.56 
                                                     
criminal records). 
4. See BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 10–11; Bannon et al., supra note 3, at 27–28 (stating that 
criminal justice debt affects housing prospects by damaging credit and discouraging legitimate 
employment). 
5. A ten-dollar monthly payment is a “typical amount” imposed on many low-income LFO 
debtors. Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-
the-poor. 
6. This hypothetical schedule of LFO debt is based on the debtor religiously making a ten-dollar 
per month payment on her principal. The amount reduced does not include any “credits” granted by 
the county as required in superior court. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.180(3) (2014).  
7. The yearly increase is calculated by calculating a twelve percent interest assessment provided 
by RCW 10.82.090, RCW 4.56.110(4), and RCW 19.52.020(1) against the amount owed at prior 
year’s end, less the amount paid. Then, the $100 yearly surcharge on unpaid LFOs provided by 
RCW 36.18.016(29) is added to the amount of interest owed, determining the yearly increase. 
8. The amount owed at year-end is calculated by subtracting the amount reduced from the amount 
owed for the prior year, then adding the amount increased. 
9. Time of Jane’s release.  
10. Jane’s LFO assessment is based on the Washington State average. BECKETT ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 15 (noting the mean felony LFO assessment in 2008 was $2540). 
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The State, finally fed up with her growing debt, is now imprisoning 
Jane for failing to pay.
11
 Her debt feels insurmountable.
12
 Maybe, rather 
than throw away $120 per year at an ever-growing debt, she will just do 
her time and stop making payments.
13
 After all, she can be imprisoned 
for nonpayment regardless of her good faith attempts to contribute.
14
 
Jane’s case, while hypothetical,15 is representative of the difficulties 
faced by many low-income felony offenders in Washington State.
16
 
Washington courts impose LFOs on felony offenders
17
 in order to help 
fund the criminal justice system and, in some cases, accumulate 
revenue.
18
 When individuals fail to pay their LFOs, they can be
19
 and 
often are imprisoned.
20
 Many scholars are decrying Washington’s and 
other states’ LFO collection tactics as resurging debtors’ prisons.21 
                                                     
11. Imprisonment for failing to pay LFO debts is authorized by RCW 10.01.180(5). Under that 
section, “[a] default in the payment of a fine or costs or any installment thereof may be collected by 
any means authorized by law for the enforcement of a judgment.” WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 10.01.180(5). 
12. See BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 39 (describing the insurmountable nature of study 
participants’ LFO assessments). 
13. Id. (explaining how, when study participants’ debts became so insurmountable, they 
ultimately decided to cease making contributions). 
14. This is the reasoning underlying some individuals’ decisions to cease paying monthly 
installment toward their LFO debts. Id. at 3, 39. 
15. For real life stories highlighting the consequences of LFOs and imprisonment for 
nonpayment, see MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS, supra note 2, at 11–18 (stories of Virginia 
Dickerson, David Ramirez, Angela Albers, C.J., and D.Z.).  
16. See BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 9–10 (discussing rising felony incarceration rates in 
Washington State as well as the reintegration difficulties experienced by rehabilitated felons); 
Shapiro, supra note 5. Although this news story was a national exposé on LFO incarceration, the 
report significantly focused on the plight of individuals in Benton County, Washington. Id. 
17. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 38.52.430 (2014) (imposing the costs of emergency response 
on individuals who are convicted of or have had their prosecution deferred for driving under the 
influence). 
18. See Shapiro, supra note 5 (noting that Benton County’s LFO collections practices make “it 
one of the state’s top revenue producers”). 
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.180(5) (“A default in the payment of a fine or costs or any 
installment thereof may be collected by any means authorized by law for the enforcement of a 
judgment.”).  
20. See BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 42–46 (interviewing individuals who have been 
imprisoned for failing to pay LFO debts). 
21. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW 
DEBTORS’ PRISONS 5 (2010) [hereinafter IN FOR A PENNY], available at 
https://www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights-racial-justice/penny-rise-americas-new-debtors-prisons 
(describing LFO systems as modern-day ‘debtors’ prisons); MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS, 
supra note 2, at 3 (“[Imprisonment for LFO nonpayment is] a modern version of the despised 
debtors’ prison.”); John B. Mitchell & Kelly Kunsch, Of Driver’s Licenses and Debtor’s Prison, 4 
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Public sentiment is largely critical of LFOs, fueled in part by the 
discussion surrounding Ferguson, Missouri.
22
 
The Washington State Supreme Court has been active in this area of 
the law, handing down rulings that champion the rights of individual 
offenders. For example, the Court recently invalidated Spokane’s “auto-
jail” policy, which mandated imprisonment upon LFO default.23 Even 
when the litigants fail to timely raise arguments challenging their LFOs, 
the Supreme Court is willing to accept discretionary review and overturn 
and remand LFO assignments.
24
 Although the validity of imprisonment 
for LFO default was arguably irrelevant to the individual litigants’ 
claims in State v. Blazina,
25
 the Court devoted a large portion of its 
opinion to describing problems within Washington’s LFO system.26 The 
Court is sensitive to the mechanisms used to fund the criminal justice 
system and the negative impacts those funding mechanisms have on 
                                                     
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 439, 443 (2005) (“[I]mprisonment for unpaid LFOs] cannot help but conjure 
up images of debtors’ prisons from Dickens.”); Bannon et al., supra note 3, at 5 (“[LFOs] leave 
debtors vulnerable for violations that result in a new form of debtors’ prison.”). 
22. On August 9, 2014, Officer Darren Wilson shot and killed Michael Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri. Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-after-
police-shooting.html?_r=0. A Missouri grand jury declined to indict the officer on criminal charges, 
sparking waves of national interest and protests. Id. Although the Department of Justice declined to 
prosecute Officer Wilson, it conducted a thorough investigation into the state of criminal justice 
affairs in Ferguson. Taking a critical approach to Ferguson’s use of LFOs and police officers as 
collections agents, the report states:  
Ferguson’s law enforcement practices are shaped by the City’s focus on revenue rather than by 
public safety needs. This emphasis on revenue has compromised the institutional character of 
Ferguson’s police department, contributing to a pattern of unconstitutional policing, and has 
also shaped its municipal court, leading to procedures that raise due process concerns and 
inflict unnecessary harm on members of the Ferguson community. Further, Ferguson’s police 
and municipal court practices both reflect and exacerbate existing racial bias, including racial 
stereotypes. 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 2 (2015); see also Eric Scigliano, Reforming Ferguson-Style “Debtors Prisons” Here 
in Washington State, CROSSCUT.COM (Apr. 10, 2015), http://crosscut.com/2015/04/ferguson-style-
debtors-prisons-here-in-washington-state/ (discussing “Ferguson-style ‘debtors’ prisons’” in the 
form of imprisonment for LFO default in Washington State). 
23. State v. Nason, 168 Wash. 2d 936, 948, 223 P.3d 848, 853 (2010) (holding Spokane, 
Washington’s “auto-jail provision” violated due process because individuals were automatically 
jailed for LFO nonpayment without a determination of willfulness). 
24. See State v. Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d 827, 833–34, 344 P.3d 680, 683 (2015) (en banc) (stating 
that although the parties failed to preserve the issue and the lower court declined to review the issue, 
the Washington State Supreme Court reached the merits of Mr. Blazina’s case, ultimately 
overturning his LFO assessment). 
25. 182 Wash. 2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015) (en banc). 
26. Id. at 835–37, 344 P.3d at 683–85 (“These problems include increased difficulty in reentering 
society, the doubtful recoupment of money by the government, and inequities in administration.”).  
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low-income individuals.
27
 It has granted review in multiple cases 
adjudicating the validity of imprisoning individuals for LFO 
nonpayment on a case-by-case basis.
28
 However, litigants have not yet 
presented the Court with a case in which it can strike down, or at least 
severely abrogate, the LFO imprisonment system as a whole.
29
 
Relying on the Washington Constitution,
30
 this Comment provides 
litigants with the tools necessary to begin building that case, challenging 
                                                     
27. Recently, the Court voted to increase traffic fines by twelve dollars. In re Adoption of the 
Amendment to IRLJ 6.2, No. 25700-A-1103 (May 12, 2015). “Chief Justice Barbara Madsen said in 
a news release Monday that raising the cost of the tickets was a tough decision, because the 
operations of the court system should not depend on fees and fines, which disproportionally hurt 
low-income people.” Gene Johnson, Washington Supreme Court Boosts Costs of Traffic Tickets, 
SEATTLE TIMES (May 18, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washington-supreme-
court-boosts-cost-of-traffic-tickets/. The decision was met with two vigorous dissents which pointed 
out the disproportionate impact increased fines would have on low income and minority individuals. 
In re Adoption of the Amendment to IRLJ 6.2, No. 25700-A-1103 (May 12, 2015) (McCloud, J., 
dissenting).  
The data shows that the majority of fees generated from infractions come not from the base 
infraction fee or even from the several additional, mandatory fees that the governing statutes 
tack on. Instead, the majority of those fees come from penalties imposed when a payment is 
missed, for whatever reason. In other words, the people who are least able to pay up front, all 
at once, are the ones who end up paying the most. That was not fair in Blazina, and it’s still not 
fair here. 
Id. Referencing the Department of Justice report explaining LFOs in Ferguson, Missouri, Justice 
McCloud calls into question whether or not Washington courts should actually be funded through 
“user fees that disproportionately burden those who can least afford it.” Id. “The majority’s position 
is consistent with best practice and the national standard. But that system is broken.” Id. 
28. Nason, 168 Wash. 2d 936, 223 P.3d 848; Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d 827, 344 P.3d 680. 
29. As of the publishing of this Comment, most litigants challenging imprisonment for LFO 
default have argued that a single individual’s—rather than all affected individuals’—due process 
rights were violated. See, e.g., Nason, 168 Wash. 2d at 940, 233 P.3d at 849; Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d 
at 837–39, 344 P.3d at 685. Even cases that have not yet made it to the Washington State Supreme 
Court bring due process claims. See, e.g., Rucker v. Spokane Cnty., No. CV-12-5157-LRS, slip op. 
at *1 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 26, 2013) (granting partial summary judgment for defendants on an aspect 
of plaintiff’s federal due process claim); State v. Nash, No. 38514-7-II, 2011 WL 198695 at *1, *3–
4 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2011). Although the trial court determined that Mr. Nash could not be 
assessed any monthly payment, the Court of Appeals refused to use the Due Process Clause to 
invalidate his LFO obligations. Id. Obligations that, due to interest charges, had ballooned from his 
initial assessment of $3,976.00 to $8,138.58. Id. Due process is not violated unless the state 
imprisons the individual for default without making an individualized determination as to whether 
that person had the ability to pay. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668 (1983). As exemplified by 
the cases discussed above, unless the system violates everyone’s due process rights by failing to 
determine if everyone’s nonpayment was willful (as was the case in Nason), it cannot be invalidated 
systemically using due process—it can only be examined on an individual level. Washington’s 
current LFO system does not, in itself, violate due process per se as it does provide an individual 
assessment of indigence. See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668. Although the Bearden court held an 
indigent individual could not be imprisoned by the state for failing to pay, it explained “[i]f the 
probationer has willfully refused to pay the fine or restitution when he has the means to pay, the 
State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanction to enforce collection.” Id. 
30. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17 (imprisonment for debt). 
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imprisonment for LFO default on a systemic level. This Comment 
argues that modern courts should return to the original, robust 
understanding of citizens’ rights against imprisonment for debt—an 
understanding that would invalidate much of the current LFO 
imprisonment system. Part I provides a brief history of imprisonment for 
debt in the United States. Part II sets forth the current system of 
imprisonment for LFO default, focusing primarily on Washington State, 
and highlights the policy arguments against imprisoning individuals for 
failing to pay. Part III explains why imprisonment for LFO nonpayment 
violates the state constitution, examining the original purpose of article I, 
section 17 as well as the provision’s more recent judicial degradation. It 
separates the case law into three eras, highlighting the cases that 
incrementally deviated from the foundational doctrine: Modern 
jurisprudence (the Third Era) deviates from the foundational principles 
(set forth in the First Era) by applying inaccurate precedent (created in 
the second Era). Finally, Part IV argues that the statutory scheme 
enabling imprisonment for failing to pay LFOs violates article I, section 
17’s foundational jurisprudence. 
I.  IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT IS PROHIBITED IN THE 
WESTERN WORLD 
History has borne continuous witness to rises and falls in 
imprisonment for debt.
31
 Although the practice has had its moments of 
popularity throughout history, those moments have been stymied by 
peoples such as the Romans,
32
 feudal lords,
33
 the Normans,
34
 the 
English,
35
 and the Americans. Historical arguments calling 
imprisonment for debt into question are still relevant today. 
Debtors’ prisons were rampant in eighteenth century England.36 
                                                     
31. See Richard E. James, Note, Putting Fear Back into the Law and Debtors Back into Prison: 
Reforming the Debtors’ Prison System, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 145–49 (2002).  
32. See, e.g., JOHN A. CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME 172–73 (1967); Becky A. Vogt, State v. 
Allison: Imprisonment for Debt in South Dakota, 46 S.D. L. REV. 334, 339 (2001). 
33. See Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 21, at 445 (“Feudal lords simply could not have their 
vassals, who were fodder in the Lord’s army, unavailable for military service because they were 
languishing in some debtor’s prison.”). 
34. See Vogt, supra note 32, at 340. 
35. See Stephen J. Ware, A 20th Century Debate About Imprisonment for Debt, 54 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 351, 376–77 (2014) (noting that imprisonment for debt was not formally abolished by 
parliament until 1970). 
36. See id. at 352–53 (2014). Using a writ of capias ad respondendum, the creditor would swear 
the debt was overdue or the debtor intended to hide, flee, or conceal property. PETER J. COLEMAN, 
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND 
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Although creditors could seize a person’s property in lieu of 
imprisonment,
37
 most preferred to first jail the debtor in hopes of 
compelling payment, turning to forced property sale only if debtors’ 
prison failed to shake loose the coin owed.
38
 
In English America, early settlers brought with them the concept of 
imprisonment for debt
39
 and by the end of the seventeenth century 
debtors’ prisons pervaded the English colonies.40 However, the colonists 
soon realized that imprisoning debtors was not the ideal method to 
compel payment: Debtors’ prisons exposed all borrowers, including 
honest ones, to potential imprisonment in the hopes of protecting 
creditors from “the tiny minority of scoundrels.”41 “Though the threat of 
incarceration must have kept some borrowers honest, imprisonment 
rarely pried loose concealed property and only sometimes prompted 
friends or relatives to pay off the debt.”42 Imprisonment for debt locked 
up valuable labor and forced the public to front the costs of supporting 
many defaulters’ dependents.43 Some debtors’ prisons were notoriously 
inhumane, a fact that, combined with the new Jeffersonian social reform 
movement,
44
 fueled arguments in favor of abolishing debtors’ prisons.45 
In the late eighteenth century, advocates began employing legal, 
moral, and efficiency-based arguments to challenge debtors’ prisons in 
England.
46
 They described imprisonment for debt as inhumane, arbitrary, 
and inefficient.
47
 Legislators discussed alternatives to imprisonment, 
such as executions of property, wage arrestment, and bankruptcy.
48
 They 
recognized that debtors’ prisons, which caused “barbarity to the poor 
                                                     
BANKRUPTCY, 1607–1900, at 5 (1974). The court would then order the sheriff seize the debtor and 
jail him or her until the principal was satisfied. Id. Alternatively, the creditor could employ a writ of 
capias ad satisfactendum, causing the debtor to be jailed immediately and to remain in prison until 
the debt was paid. Vogt, supra note 32, at 341. 
37. See Vogt, supra note 32, at 342. 
38. See id. 
39. See COLEMAN, supra note 36, at 6. 
40. See id. at 249. 
41. Id. at 250. 
42. Id. 
43. See id.  
44. See JOHN B. MCMASTER, THE ACQUISITION OF POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL RIGHTS 
OF MAN IN AMERICA 52 (1903). 
45. See COLEMAN, supra note 36, at 254–55. 
46. See, e.g., JAMES STEPHEN, CONSIDERATIONS ON IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT (London, T. Evans 
1770). 
47. See id. at 5–6.  
48. See Ware, supra note 35, at 373–75. 
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unhappy class of people, who now breathe out their miserable lives in 
loathsome prisons on civil actions,”49 were more likely to imprison 
honest but unfortunate debtors than the dishonest men who were more 
deserving of punishment.
50
 Such practice harmed both the honest debtors 
and the spurned creditors by destroying the borrower’s estate without the 
benefit of punishing those who maliciously abused commercial debt.
51
 
The British critics’ American counterparts made similar arguments, 
explaining that imprisonment for debt only worked in “barely a tenth of 
the cases and . . . complained that the fear of imprisonment encouraged 
deceit and fraud, and that honest defaulters went to jail while rogues 
often went free.”52 
In 1869, British Parliament began taking steps to strike down debtors’ 
prisons, starting with statutes prohibiting imprisonment for debt except 
in limited situations such as contempt of court, defaulting on bankruptcy 
orders, and debts owed to non-commercial creditors.
53
 However, by 
maintaining creditors’ rights to use contempt to imprison individuals 
who had failed to pay, Parliament undermined its credible attempt to 
remedy the debtors’ prison problem. In response, Parliament gradually 
narrowed its laws, eventually abolishing the practice entirely.
54
 
Debtors’ prisons continued in America until the early 1800s when 
states began abolishing the practice.
55
 By 1811, many eastern states had 
abolished imprisonment for debt, and by the 1870s, most of the 
remaining states and territories had followed suit.
56
 Imprisonment for 
debt is currently prohibited by forty-one state constitutions.
57
 
                                                     
49. STEPHEN, supra note 46, at 45. 
50. Id. at 55 (“It may seem a rash declaration, but it is strictly true, that a rogue has a much better 
chance to obtain a certificate than an honest man; and the person who has little or nothing to give 
up, than one who can make a good dividend.”). 
51. Id. 
52. COLEMAN, supra note 36, at 255. 
53. See The Debtors Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 62 (Eng.); Ware, supra note 35, at 354–55. 
54. Ware, supra note 35, at 376–77. 
55. COLEMAN, supra note 36, at 256; James, supra note 31, at 147. 
56. COLEMAN, supra note 36, at 256. 
57. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 20; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 17; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 18; ARK. 
CONST. art. II, § 16; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 12; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11; 
GA. CONST. § I, ¶ XXIII; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 19; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 15; ILL. CONST. art. I, 
§ 14; IND. CONST. art. I, § 22; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 19; KAN. CONST. bill of rights, § 16; KY. 
CONST. § 18; MD. CONST. art. III, § 38; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 21; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 12; MISS. 
CONST. art. III, § 30; MO. CONST. art. I, § 11; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 20; 
NEV. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 21; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 28; 
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 15; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 15; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 13; OR. CONST. art. I, 
§ 19; PA. CONST. art. I, § 16; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 11; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; S.D. CONST. art. VI, 
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The fall of debtors’ prisons in both England and the early United 
States was largely due to the fact that that imprisonment for debt failed 
to accomplish repayment, caused negative social effects, and was 
outweighed by adequate alternatives.
58
 These arguments still command 
merit today. 
II.  DEBTORS’ PRISONS ARE RESURGING IN THE UNITED 
STATES IN THE FORM OF IMPRISONMENT FOR UNPAID 
LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS 
De facto debtors’ prisons exist in contemporary America.59 Because 
they run contrary to federal
60
 and state law, they are “implemented 
through the ‘smokescreen of civil contempt’”61: courts jail individuals 
for willfully failing to pay a court-ordered judgment.
62
 While only about 
one-third of states imprison individuals for contemptuous failure-to-pay, 
a sanction intended to coerce payment,
63
 nearly all states continue to 
sanction debtors for failing to appear.
64
 
Perhaps the most compelling example of modern imprisonment for 
debt in the guise of contempt is the practice of imprisoning individuals 
for failing to pay LFOs. Many formerly incarcerated individuals re-enter 
society owing the State fines, restitution, fees, and costs.
65
 Individuals 
are often saddled with exorbitant interest rates, quickly transforming 
                                                     
§ 15; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 16; VT. CONST. c. 2, 
§ 40; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 16; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 5.  
58. James, supra note 31, at 148. 
59. Id. at 149. 
60. As early as 1896 there was a federal statute limiting imprisonment for debt. Id. at 154 
(discussing §§ 990–992 of the Revised Statutes of the United States). 
61. Id. at 165. 
62. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.030(2)(a) (2014) (allowing Washington courts to imprison 
an individual for contempt of court when the individual fails to complete a court ordered act that is 
within her power). 
63. Lea Shepard, Creditors’ Contempt, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1509, 1543 (2011). 
64. Id. at 1544–45. Although there is a legal distinction between imprisonment for failing to 
appear (a punitive action) and imprisonment for failing to pay (a coercive action), Shepard argues 
that in practical application it is a distinction without a difference. Id. at 1545–48. She explains the 
concept of “contempt confusion”—because failing to pay and failing to appear are inextricably 
intertwined, “a court’s threat to imprison a debtor for failure to appear in court can put direct 
pressure on the debtor to pay the creditor.” Id. at 1547. “Once a ‘no-show’ debtor is arrested or 
threatened with arrest, she may find it difficult to distinguish between the immediate source of the 
arrest threat, her failure to appear in court, and the proximate cause of the threat of incarceration: the 
debt default itself.” Id. at 1546. In essence, imprisonment for failing to pay and imprisonment for 
failing to appear are indistinguishable to the debtor. 
65. Shapiro, supra note 5. 
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even minor LFO debts into obligations that are difficult or impossible to 
satisfy.
66
 Those who defy a court order to cure LFO nonpayment can be 
held in contempt and jailed for default.
67
 
The LFO system is closely tied to the “offender-funded” model of 
criminal justice—financing the criminal justice system out of the 
pockets of those who are entangled in it.
68
 Since the “tough-on-crime 
era”69 when the offender-funded model was conceptualized, the 
criminal-justice system has dramatically expanded.
70
 LFOs have grown 
accordingly.
71
 What may have started as a workable solution to funding 
problems has grown to impose impractical, even counterproductive 
burdens on low-income offenders. 
III. DE FACTO DEBTORS’ PRISONS IN WASHINGTON STATE 
Washington State’s legislative branch has firmly embraced the 
“offender-funded” model of criminal justice. Washington State 
contributes a mere 10.6% of the total cost of trial courts and indigent 
defense—leaving local governments to come up with nearly ninety 
percent of the total cost of Washington’s criminal justice system.72 Out 
of every state in the nation, Washington ranks absolute last in funding 
                                                     
66. Id.; see also BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 2 (“As a result of high rates of non-payment 
and the accrual of interest, the legal debt of most of those sentenced . . . had grown rather than 
shrunk [in three years].”). 
67. BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 58 (“Indeed, it appears that non-payment not uncommonly 
leads to the issuance of a warrant, re-arrest, and re-incarceration in some Washington State 
counties.”).  
68. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S “OFFENDER-
FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 1–6 (2014), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/ 
2014/02/05/profiting-probation-0 (describing various modes of the offender funded model of 
criminal justice as well as problems with its privatization). 
69. See Shapiro, supra note 5 (noting the tough-on-crime policies began in the 1970s). 
70. BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 9; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
NCJ 243920, PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS AND ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991–2012, at 1 
(2013) (“Between 1978 and 2009, the number of prisoners held in federal and state facilities in the 
United States increased almost 430% from 294,400 on December 31, 1978, to 1,555,600 on 
December 31, 2009.”). 
71. Bannon ET AL., supra note 3, at 7 (“Criminal justice debt is growing at an alarming rate across 
the country.”). 
72. BD. FOR JUDICIAL ADMIN., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: THE COURT FUNDING CRISIS IN 
WASHINGTON STATE 5 (2004) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY]. Since this report, the legislature 
revised trial court funding procedures, hoping to ease the burden of the underfunded criminal justice 
system. Act of May 13, 2005, ch. 457, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 1948. While this legislation has 
helped, it has not alleviated much of the burden imposed on local governments. BD. FOR JUDICIAL 
ADMIN., TRIAL COURT IMPROVEMENT ACCOUNT USE REPORT FOR 2013, at 11 (2014) (“In the 
aggregate, TCIA funds account for a very small percentage of a court’s total budget.”). 
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judicial and legal services.
73
 It is hard to blame legislators for turning to 
the offender funded model to keep the system afloat—the money has to 
come from somewhere. This Comment recognizes the State’s funding 
crisis and does not mean to challenge the LFO system in its entirety. 
LFOs that are timely paid do provide much needed funding for the state 
criminal justice system. The Washington Legislature embraces them as 
“an important part of taking personal responsibility for one’s actions.”74 
However, as the subsequent sections explain, there are serious 
problems with funding the criminal justice system by imprisoning 
individuals for unpaid LFOs. Individuals who can easily understand and 
pay their LFOs often satisfy their entire obligation right away, just as 
you or I might pay a large traffic fine or IRS penalty. In such cases, 
imprisonment is not required and the criminal justice system gets its 
funding with arguably little expense. However, less fortunate individuals 
are less likely to make timely LFO payments and thus more likely to 
face imprisonment.
75
 Those that can and will pay their LFOs do so with 
little state prodding while those that believe they cannot or are unwilling 
to pay their LFOs face imprisonment—imprisonment that drains 
government coffers and does not effectively compel payment.
76
 
Doing away with imprisonment for LFO default would not do away 
with the LFO funding mechanism. Those who can easily pay their LFOs 
will still do so in a timely manner. Those that feel they cannot or are 
unwilling to pay their LFOs will still go into default. Removing 
imprisonment for debt would merely require the system to use different 
existing—and perhaps more effective—methods such as wage 
garnishment
77
 to compel LFO payment. Imprisoning defaulting 
                                                     
73. JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 72, at 4. 
74. Legal Financial Obligations—Collection, ch. 106, 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 943, § 1 (codified 
at WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090 (2014)). 
75. Although Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), prohibits states from assessing LFOs 
against indigent offenders (requiring a case-by-case determination), the process by which ability to 
pay is determined by some Washington courts appears “to be standardized rather than based on an 
assessment of the particular circumstances faced by defendants.” BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 
65; Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the Washington Defender Association as 
Amicus Curiae at 5, State v. Nash, No. 38514-7-II at *1, *3–4 (2011); see also Bannon et al., supra 
note 3, at 13 (“[N]one of the fifteen examined states pay adequate attention to whether individuals 
have the resources to pay . . . .”). 
76. See infra notes 117–39 and accompanying text. 
77. Wage garnishment might be a viable alternative in part because of the additional protections 
already in place. An employer may not terminate an employee for having their wages garnished. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 6.27.170 (2014) (an employee may not be discharged for having two or fewer 
wage garnishments per year). There is no such protection for employees who are imprisoned for 
failing to pay LFOs. Furthermore, Washington has statutory protections in place to ensure that 
garnishments are not overly-onerous on low income individuals. Id. § 6.27.150. The current wage 
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offenders, although intended to help fund the criminal justice system, 
imposes serious consequences that are not counterbalanced by program 
success.
78
 Compared to other states, Washington’s LFO system imposes 
one of the highest fees, costs, and interest
79
 bills on offenders.
80
 
Washington imposes mandatory and discretionary LFOs, billing 
offenders for the costs of and fees related to court-appointed attorneys,
81
 
restitution,
82
 defense,
83
 fines,
84
 confinement,
85
 guilty convictions or 
pleas,
86
 deferred prosecution,
87
 warrants for failing to appear,
88
 pretrial 
supervision,
89
 impaneling a jury,
90
 extradition,
91
 electronic monitoring,
92
 
emergency response,
93
 crime laboratory analysis,
94
 biological sample 
                                                     
garnishment structure already has provisions in place that could help compel LFO payment while 
avoiding some of the negative effects of imprisonment.  
78. For an examination of a similar problem with contempt proceedings and the offender-funded 
model of criminal justice in the context of traffic fines and driver’s license suspensions in 
Washington, see generally Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 21. 
79. Currently, the 2015 Washington Legislature is considering two bills intended to reform the 
LFO imprisonment system. The bills as proposed would eliminate interest on non-restitution LFOs 
and make it easier for judges to reduce or waive LFO debt. The bills also attempt to better define 
willfulness in the context of indigent individuals’ failure to pay. H.R. REP. NO. 64-1390, Reg. Sess., 
at 3 (Wash. 2015); S. REP. NO. 64-5713, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015). However, the bills being 
considered by the legislature still allow imprisonment for “willful” nonpayment of LFOs in the form 
of civil contempt. H.R. REP. NO. 64-1390, Reg. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2015) (report by H. Comm. on 
Judiciary Appropriations); see also S. REP. NO. 64-5713, Reg. Sess., at 2 (Wash. 2015) (report by S. 
Comm. on Law and Justice, Feb. 17, 2015). Although House Bill 1390 passed the House by an 
astounding margin of ninety-four to four, it seems to have died on the Senate floor. S. REP. NO. 64-
5713, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015); WASH. STATE LEG., SB 5713 – 2015-16 (Sept. 22, 2015), 
http://app.leg.wa.gov/billinfo/summary.aspx?bill=5713&year=20150).  
80. Michael L. Vander Giessen, Note, Legislative Reforms for Washington State’s Criminal 
Monetary Penalties, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 547, 549 (2012). 
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(30) (2014). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. § 9.94A.760(2) (imposing a cost of $50 per day for incarceration in prison and up to $100 
per day for incarceration in county jail). 
86. Id. § 36.18.020(2)(h) (2014) (imposing a cost of $200). 
87. Id. § 10.01.160(2) (2014) (imposing a cost up to $250). 
88. Id. (imposing a cost up to $100). 
89. Id. (imposing a cost up to $150). 
90. Id. § 36.18.016(3)(b) (imposing costs of $125 for six-person juries, and $250 for twelve-
person juries). 
91. Id. § 9.95.210(2). 
92. Id.  
93. Id.  
94. Id. § 43.43.690(1) (2014) (imposing a mandatory fee of $100 for each offense). 
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collection,
95
 interlocal drug funds,
96
 and “any other financial obligation 
that is assessed to the offender as a result of a felony conviction.”97 The 
municipal governments levy annual surcharges against unpaid LFOs
98
 
and impose a twelve percent interest rate,
99
 the second highest in the 
nation.
100
 Washington courts can
101
 and do
102
 utilize contempt to 
imprison individuals for failing to pay LFOs. In superior court, 
individuals must be credited a sum of money towards their obligations 
each day they are imprisoned for default.
103
 
A.  De Facto Debtors’ Prisons Have Adverse Consequences in 
Washington 
Imprisonment for failing to pay LFOs is not uncommon in 
Washington.
104
 The practice has adverse consequences for defaulting 
offenders as well as the public.
105
 Recent research suggests that 
imprisonment does not efficiently compel LFO payment.
106
 Imposing a 
                                                     
95. Id. § 43.43.7541 (imposing a mandatory fee of $100 for each sentence imposed). 
96. Id. § 9.94A.030(30). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. § 36.18.016(29) (limiting fees to $100 annually). 
99. Id. § 10.82.090(1); id.§ 4.56.110(4); id.§ 19.52.020(1) (imposing an interest rate consisting of 
the greater between twelve percent and four points above the Treasury Bill rate); H.R. REP. NO. 58-
2485, Reg. Sess., at 2 (Wash. 2004) (finding that twelve percent has generally exceeded the 
Treasury Bill, making twelve percent the interest rate on judgments for at least the prior decade). 
100. Alison Warren, Support LFO Bills, THE SPOKESMAN REVIEW at B5 (Feb. 14, 2015). 
101. Imprisonment for failing to pay LFO debts is authorized by WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 10.01.180(5) (2014) (“A default in the payment of a fine or costs or any installment thereof may 
be collected by any means authorized by law for the enforcement of a judgment.”). 
102. See, e.g., State v. Nason, 168 Wash. 2d 936, 941, 223 P.3d 848, 849 (2010) (examining the 
trial court’s decision ordering the defendant serve ninety-five days in jail for falling behind on LFO 
payments); BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 58. 
103. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.180(3) (“If a term of imprisonment for contempt for nonpayment 
of a fine or costs is ordered, the term of imprisonment shall be set forth in the commitment 
order . . . . A person committed for nonpayment of a fine or costs shall be given credit toward 
payment for each day of imprisonment at the rate specified in the commitment order.”). This act of 
crediting individuals for their incarceration is conceptually similar to “peonage,” a practice 
Congress outlawed early in United States history. Peonage Abolition Act, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 
(1867) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012) and 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012)). The United States 
Supreme Court upheld this prohibition. Clyatt v. U.S., 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905) (explaining 
peonage). 
104. BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 58. 
105. See Bannon et al., supra note 3, at 5 (“What at first glance appears to be easy money for the 
state can carry significant hidden costs—both human and financial—for individuals, for the 
government, and for the community at large.”). 
106. See, e.g., James, supra note 31, at 166–67 (arguing that because the current use of debtors’ 
prisons is not transparent, modern debtors are unaware they risk imprisonment for failing to pay and 
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punishment with such adverse consequences, absent evidence of 
effectiveness, conflicts with the stated goals of the Washington 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1981,
107
 including the enumerated 
commitment to reducing recidivism.
108
 
Warrants and arrests for failing to pay impose adverse consequences 
on rehabilitated offenders. Contempt proceedings label defaulters as 
“fleeing felons,” automatically disqualifying them from government 
benefits designed to help provide the necessities of life.
109
 Imprisonment 
has significant negative consequences for individuals, impacting 
education, occupation, family life, credit scores, and ability to afford 
child support.
110
 Individuals cannot vote until they have satisfied their 
court-ordered LFOs.
111
 Many who are incarcerated for unpaid LFOs fall 
below federal poverty guidelines.
112
 Often, they are trying to support 
families and children while they pay, or fall behind, on their LFO 
debt.
113
 Furthermore, LFOs affect minorities and the poor 
disproportionately and exacerbate recidivism.
114
 
Although the United States Supreme Court held it unconstitutional to 
imprison indigent defendants for failing to pay,
115
 some scholars have 
begun to question courts’ abilities to determine when an individual is 
indigent and thus constitutionally protected.
116
 Washington’s current 
practice risks incarcerating individuals who truly cannot pay. 
                                                     
thus are not deterred by the practice).  
107. Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 137, 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 519 (codified as amended 
at WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A (2014)). 
108.  WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010 (“The purpose of [the Sentencing Reform Act] is to . . . (7) 
[r]educe the risk of reoffending by offenders in the community.”); BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 
4 (“[W]e conclude that the legislature’s goal of holding offenders financially accountable for the 
consequences of their criminal behavior is in tension with its efforts to reduce recidivism by 
facilitating the successful reintegration of Washington State residents with a felony conviction.”). 
109. BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 (noting that “fleeing felons” are ineligible for Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families, Social Security Insurance, assisted housing, and food stamp 
programs). 
110. Id. at 10; see also Bannon et al., supra note 3, at 27–29. 
111. Madison v. State, 161 Wash. 2d 85, 110–11, 163 P.3d 757, 773 (2007) (holding that 
Washington’s felon disenfranchisement scheme prohibiting felons from voting until they have 
satisfied all LFOs is constitutional); see also Bannon et al., supra note 3, at 29 (characterizing 
criminal justice debt as a “poll tax”). 
112. BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 2–3. 
113. Id. at 3, 32. 
114. Id. at 57–59; Giessen, supra note 80, at 552–53. 
115. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983). 
116. BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 65; Brief for the Washington Defender Association, et al. 
as Amici Curiae at 5, State v. Nash, 2011 WL 198695 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2013) (No. 38514-7-
II); Bannon et al., supra note 3, at 13. 
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B. Imprisonment for Failing to Pay LFOs Is Ineffective 
Washington’s system adversely affects individuals and risks 
incarcerating—and re-incarcerating—the indigent. Arguably those 
downsides might be counterbalanced if the policy effectively 
accomplished its goals. However, there is little evidence that 
imprisonment compels LFO payment or deters default: “The threat of 
criminal justice intervention create[s] an incentive for those who ha[ve] 
not made regular LFO payments to hide from the authorities, but 
nonetheless ma[kes] it difficult for those same persons to disentangle 
themselves from the criminal justice system.”117 In a study examining 
the consequences of LFO debt, some participants described the 
overwhelming nature and sheer magnitude of their debt, and their 
resulting decision to “ignore it entirely”: 
Cause in all reality there’s no way I can pay it, so, I don’t worry 
about it. If it came down to it, they put me in jail, I’d serve time 
to pay off the fines, that would be fine with me, either way. I 
mean, it’s impossible to pay. I only make $180 a month 
anyway.
118
 
Another participant lamented: 
I mean, even if you have a normal job, you can’t really gain no 
headway. I mean, the bottom line is if I go pay on it, and $50 a 
month ain’t covering it, and I’m still, you know I’m still toiling 
forward, then why would you want to pay on something without 
seeing any deduction in the debt that you owe?
119
 
Despite offenders being aware of their debts, there is little evidence that 
the current LFO system adequately deters nonpayment. Many 
individuals stop making payments because of the perceived 
insurmountable barriers imposed by the system.
120
 
Furthermore, when debtors do not understand the consequences of 
nonpayment, they logically cannot be deterred from default. Individuals 
lack clarity regarding their LFO obligations and rights
121
 and “the public 
views the risk of imprisonment for debt to be either non-existent or very 
small.”122 The likelihood that individuals will be deterred by the very 
                                                     
117. BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 3–4. 
118. Id. at 39. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 4–5, 39–40. 
121. Id. at 47–52 (“[R]espondents described a profound sense of uncertainty about the rules 
governing assessment and collection of their LFOs.”). 
122. James, supra note 31, at 167. 
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real—but little known—threat of imprisonment for LFO nonpayment is 
proportionally small.
123
 Arguably, the Legislature’s “stealthy” use of 
contempt to circumvent the constitutional prohibition on imprisonment 
for debt has undone any chance of significant deterrence.
124
 
Meanwhile, Washington counties are collecting barely a fraction of 
total debts owed.
125
 According to analyses completed by Washington 
State Representative Ross Hunter, more than eighty percent of LFOs are 
“uncollectible.”126 When a county imprisons an LFO debtor, it pays for 
that debtor’s incarceration costs, as well as a daily “credit” to the 
debtor’s LFO account.127 For example, it costs Benton County, 
Washington $65 per day to house and feed one inmate.
128
 The County 
credits inmates $50 for every day they spend in jail.
129
 Each day Benton 
County keeps an LFO defaulter in jail, its taxpayers lose at least $115.
130
 
This calculation does not take into account the costs of police action, 
prosecuting and defense attorneys, jail overcrowding, and opportunity 
costs, all of which affect the extent of the system’s burden on 
taxpayers.
131
 Imprisonment for failing to pay LFOs also diverts public 
servants and officers from fulfilling their public safety and rehabilitation 
purposes.
132
 In Ferguson, Missouri, the local government’s emphasis on 
using police officers and courts to generate revenue exacerbated 
community distrust, degrading citizens’ respect for the criminal justice 
institution.
133
 
Furthermore, when individuals are incarcerated, they are unable to 
work and pay down their LFO debts. What was true in the nineteenth 
                                                     
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 167–69. 
125. Shapiro, supra note 5. 
126. Ross Hunter, Debtors Prisons—Legal Financial Obligations, ROSSHUNTER.INFO (Mar. 11, 
2015), http://www.rosshunter.info/2015/03/debtors_prisons/#_ftn1; see also BECKETT ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 4 (“[Z]ero percent of the fees, fines and restitution orders assessed in 2004 were paid for 
approximately half of the convictions three years post-sentencing.”). 
127. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.180(3) (2014). 
128. Shapiro, supra note 5. 
129. Kristin M. Kraemer, Paying Fines with Jail Time Being Debated, TRI-CITY HERALD, Nov. 
3, 2013, A1. 
130. $65 + $50 = $115. 
131. See Bannon et al., supra note 3, at 25–26 (calling imprisonment for LFO nonpayment 
“penny-wise and pound-foolish” and explaining that “[w]hile states focus on the income such 
collection practices bring in, they generally fail to look at the other side of the balance sheet, 
including costs imposed on sheriffs’ offices, local jails and prisons, prosecutors and defense 
attorneys, and the courts themselves”). 
132. See Bannon et al., supra note 3, at 31. 
133. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 22, at 2–6. 
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century is just as true today: “Debtor’s prison does not work when the 
debtor is impoverished. No money will be collected while the debtor is 
incarcerated, and he or she likely will be poorer when released.”134 
Expending public funds on a system that has not been shown to 
effectively deter nonpayment, combined with the fact that individuals 
are not making actual payments when they are imprisoned, is 
inconsistent with one of the purposes of the Washington Sentencing Act 
of 1981: to “[m]ake frugal use of the state’s and local governments’ 
resources.”135 
Many scholars, researchers, and advocates criticize Washington’s 
LFO imprisonment system as embodying debtors’ prisons.136 It is both 
inefficient and socially detrimental. Washington couches imprisonment 
for unpaid LFOs as imprisonment for contempt of court, a controversial 
work-around borrowed from nineteenth century Parliament.
137
 Given the 
heightened litigation in this area
138
 and authorities suggesting the LFO 
imprisonment system is economically inefficient, one would think the 
practice would currently be subject to considerable institutional 
challenges. However, most advocates are challenging the system using 
only case-by-case due process arguments.
139
 
                                                     
134. Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 21, at 460. 
135. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010(6) (2014). 
136. See, e.g., IN FOR A PENNY, supra note 21, at 5 (describing LFO systems as “modern-day 
‘debtors’ prisons’”); MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that 
characterizing imprisonment for LFO nonpayment in Washington as “a modern version of the 
despised debtors’ prison”); Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 21, at 443 (noting that imprisonment for 
unpaid LFOs “cannot help but conjure up images of debtors’ prisons from Dickens”); Bannon et al., 
supra note 3, at 5 (characterizing imprisonment for LFO nonpayment as “a new form of debtors’ 
prison”). 
137. When crafting laws to limit imprisonment for debt, nineteenth century Parliament retained 
an exception allowing imprisonment for contempt. Ware, supra note 35, at 355–56. The contempt 
exception has been criticized by more modern scholars. Id. at 355 n.24. 
138. See, e.g., Rucker v. Spokane Cnty., No. CV-12-5157-LRS, slip op. at *6 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 
26, 2013) (granting partial summary judgment for defendants on an aspect of plaintiff’s federal due 
process claim); State v. Nash, No. 38514-7-II, 2011 WL 198695, at *1, *3–4 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 
6, 2011). Although the trial court determined that Mr. Nash could not be assessed any monthly 
payment, the court of appeals refused to use the Due Process Clause to invalidate his LFOs. Id. 
Obligations that, due to interest charges, had ballooned from his initial assessment of $3,976.00 to 
$8,138.58. Id.; see also State v. Nason, 168 Wash. 2d 936, 948, 233 P.3d 848, 853 (2010) 
(individual litigation invalidating Spokane, Washington’s “auto-jail provision” wherein individuals 
were automatically jailed for LFO nonpayment without a determination of willfulness); Class 
Action Complaint at 1–2, Cavnar v. Bounceback, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00235-RMP, 2015 WL 4429095 
(E.D. Wash. July 18, 2014) (class action challenging a private debt collector’s practice using the 
county prosecutor’s letterhead to compel payment of court fees and fines). 
139. None of the cases cited supra, note 138 made any citation to WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17 
(prohibiting imprisonment for debt). According to WestlawNext, only seventy-eight cases have ever 
cited the Washington constitutional prohibition on imprisonment for debt. The most recent case to 
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The subsequent sections set forth the tools necessary to attack 
imprisonment for LFO nonpayment on a systemic level. This Comment 
recognizes that case law has substantially abrogated the once robust 
Washington constitutional prohibition on imprisonment for debt, making 
a systemic challenge unrealistic. However, the current jurisprudence is 
rife with inconsistencies, and this Comment argues that the Washington 
State Supreme Court should revise its interpretation and return to the 
foundational doctrine. 
IV. IMPRISONING INDIVIDUALS FOR LFO NONPAYMENT 
VIOLATES THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION 
Imprisoning individuals for failing to pay LFOs runs contrary to both 
the spirit and the letter of Washington’s Constitution. However, the 
Washington State Supreme Court has not yet declared this practice 
unconstitutional. Over time, the jurisprudence expounding article I, 
section 17 has become muddled, generating confusion and resulting in 
doctrines that failed to respect foundational courts’ decisions and the 
constitutional delegates’ original intent. This Comment clarifies the 
meaning of article I, section 17 and explains how the provision’s plain 
language and the strong populist ideals embodied in Washington’s bill of 
rights conflict with the current LFO system. This Comment provides a 
foundation that can be used to challenge the modern jurisprudence by 
describing the evolution of article I, section 17 interpretations over time. 
Modern case law misinterprets the precedent and fails to respect the 
foundational doctrine set forth by the state’s first courts. 
A.  The Plain Language of Washington’s Constitution Unambiguously 
Prohibits Jailing Individuals for Failing to Pay LFOs 
Washington’s LFO system and its resulting imprisonment for debt is 
not the product of a weak constitutional provision. In fact, article I, 
section 17 might be best described as strongly worded and “no-
nonsense”: 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in cases of 
                                                     
cite the provision more than in passing is Britannia Holdings Ltd. v. Greer, 127 Wash. App. 926, 
930–31, 113 P.3d 1041, 1043 (2005) (applying section 17 to a judgment for contract breach 
between two individual litigants). The last time the Washington State Supreme Court cited this 
provision was in State v. Curry, 118 Wash. 2d 911, 918, 829 P.2d 166, 169 (1992) (remarking 
offhandedly that the provision would likely prohibit imprisoning individuals for being unable to pay 
their debts). 
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absconding debtors.
140
 
This provision has not changed since its adoption at the Washington 
Constitutional Convention in 1889.
141
 On its face, it appears to be 
absolute: No person may be imprisoned for debt unless he or she is 
absconding. “An absconding debtor is one who leaves, or is about to 
leave, the jurisdiction, or who conceals himself within the jurisdiction, 
for the purpose of avoiding the process of the courts . . . .”142 Facially, 
article I, section 17 requires that absolutely no person be imprisoned for 
failing to pay a debt unless that person is fleeing from his creditors.
143
 
This Comment addresses only non-absconding LFO debtors—
individuals who have not tried to flee the state’s jurisdiction or conceal 
themselves in order to avoid paying their LFO debt. The systemic 
challenge to the LFO system levied by this Comment pertains to those 
“honest but unfortunate” individuals who remain in the state and 
cannot—or have chosen not to—make payments on their LFO 
obligations. Likely, the vast majority of imprisoned LFO debtors are 
non-absconding.
144
 To the extent the current system risks imprisoning 
non-absconding LFO debtors, it is unconstitutional. A system that no 
longer risks imprisoning non-absconding individuals—such as a 
garnishment-based system allowing imprisonment only after the 
individual flees or hides from valid garnishment—would not offend 
article I, section 17. 
1. Imprisoning People for Failing to Pay Is “Imprisonment” Within 
Article I, Section 17 
By using contempt proceedings to imprison individuals for failing to 
pay LFOs, Washington is imprisoning non-absconding individuals for 
debt, violating the unambiguous plain language of article I, section 17. 
Under the conventional approach to constitutional interpretation in 
Washington, this should be the end of the matter: 
[I]t is a cardinal rule of construction that the language of a state 
                                                     
140. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
141. Compare WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1889), with WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
142. Burrichter v. Cline, 3 Wash. 135, 136, 28 P. 367, 368 (1891). 
143. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 490 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “absconding debtor” as “[a] 
debtor who flees from creditors to avoid having to pay a debt”). 
144. As the vast majority of imprisoned LFO debtors are low-income, many could not flee the 
state to avoid their obligations even if they wished to do so. See BECKETT ET AL., supra note 2, at 
27–41 (examining the financial and social consequences of LFOs in Washington); COLEMAN, supra 
note 36, at 255 (noting that historically, honest but unfortunate, non-absconding debtors were 
imprisoned while the rogues went free). 
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Constitution, more than that of any other of the written laws, is 
to be taken in its general and ordinary sense. The reason for the 
rule lies in the fact that its makers are the people who adopt 
it. . . . “Every word employed in the Constitution is to be 
expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the 
context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge 
it.”145 
Contrary to the plain language of its provision, Washington is 
imprisoning non-absconding individuals. 
2. Non-Fine LFOs Are “Debts” Within Article I, Section 17 
The question then becomes: What, if any, LFOs constitute “debts” 
within the meaning of the Constitution? The word “debt” is a broad term 
and should be determined in its “popular and general sense,” 
encompassing all “obligations due from one person to another of every 
character.”146 Debt is a “specific sum of money due by agreement or 
otherwise.”147 Thus, article I, section 17 prohibits imprisoning a debtor 
for failing to pay obligations due to another person or entity of “every 
character.” The provision does not apply to unpaid fines,148 taxes, or 
license fees.
149
 
A substantial amount of LFOs—what this Comment calls “non-fine 
LFOs”—do not constitute fines, taxes, or license fees, thus falling within 
the purview of article I, section 17. Such LFOs include court-appointed 
attorneys’ fees,150 restitution,151 costs of defense,152 confinement costs,153 
the cost of guilty convictions or pleas,
154
 deferred prosecution costs,
155
 
costs of a warrant for failing to appear,
156
 pretrial supervision fees,
157
 
                                                     
145. Bronson v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 275, 152 P. 1039, 1043 (1915) (quoting 1 JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 451 (1891)). 
146. Id. at 277, 152 P. at 1044. 
147. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (10th ed. 2014). 
148. BEVERLY PAULIK ROSENOW, THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 1889, at 507 (Quentin Shipley Smith ed., 1999). 
149. Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 660–62, 30 P.2d 646, 648–49 (1934). 
150. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(30) (2014). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. § 9.94A.760(2) (imposing providing $50 per day for incarceration in prison and up to 
$100 per day for incarceration in county jail). 
154. Id. § 36.18.020(2)(h) (imposing a cost of $200). 
155. Id. § 10.01.160(2) (imposing a cost up to $250). 
156. Id. (imposing a cost up to $100). 
157. Id. (imposing a cost up to $150). 
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jury costs,
158
 extradition costs,
159
 electronic monitoring,
160
 emergency 
response costs,
161
 crime laboratory analysis fees,
162
 biological sample 
collection fees,
163
 costs of interlocal drug funds,
164
 and “any other 
financial obligation that is assessed to the offender as a result of a felony 
conviction.”165 These are all obligations due from one (the offender) to 
another (the government, or in the case of restitution, the victim), thus 
constituting “debts” within the provision. 
In addition to excluding fines, taxes, and license fees, article I, section 
17 prohibits imprisonment only for civil debts.
166
 However, non-fine 
LFOs are civil debts. The Washington State Supreme Court 
characterizes Washington’s statute allowing imprisonment for LFO 
nonpayment as civil in nature.
167
 Thus, non-fine LFOs are civil debts 
within article I, section 17 and the provision should prohibit imprisoning 
individuals for LFO default. 
However, one Washington State Supreme Court case holds, at least in 
part, that LFOs do not fall within the protections embodied by article I, 
section 17. In upholding imprisonment for willful failure to pay court 
ordered public defenders’ fees, the Court in State v. Barklind168 
explained that probation orders did not constitute a “debt” under article 
I, section 17.
169
 “A debt is created only in the sense that the order 
required defendant to repay society for a part of what it lost as a result of 
his commission of a crime.”170 At first glance, this seems to settle the 
issue: LFOs (at least court-ordered public defender fees) fall outside of 
the constitutional prohibition on imprisonment for debt. 
However, the Barklind Court cited only one case in support of its key 
proposition: Decker v. Decker,
171
 which held as a matter of public policy 
                                                     
158. Id. § 36.18.016(3)(b) ($125 for six-person juries, $250 for twelve-person juries). 
159. Id. § 9.95.210(2). 
160. Id.  
161. Id. 
162. Id. § 43.43.690(1) (imposing a mandatory fee of $100 for each offense). 
163. Id. § 43.43.7541 (imposing a mandatory fee of $100 for each sentence imposed). 
164. Id. § 9.94A.030(30). 
165. Id. 
166. ROSENOW, supra note 148, at 507 (noting the sponsor of article I, section 17’s explanation to 
the delegation that the provision would only apply to civil debts). 
167. Smith v. Whatcom Cnty. Dist. Ct., 147 Wash. 2d 98, 105, 52 P.3d 485, 489 (2002). 
168. 87 Wash. 2d 814, 557 P.2d 314 (1976). 
169. Id. at 819–20, 557 P.2d at 318–19.  
170. Id. at 820, 557 P.2d at 319. 
171. 52 Wash. 2d 456, 326 P.2d 332 (1958). 
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that familial support obligations are not “debts.”172 The Barklind Court’s 
unwavering reliance on Decker is problematic for two reasons. First, 
imprisonment for failing to satisfy family support obligations is itself 
facing criticism.
173
 Second, debts to society arising from the commission 
of a crime and debts arising from familial responsibilities are readily 
distinguishable. Society has long recognized a fundamental obligation to 
protect one’s family.174 Courts need the power to imprison individuals 
for defaulting on family support obligations to ensure dependents are 
supported and to ensure family conflicts are expediently settled.
175
 
Failing to support one’s family “involves considerably more than the 
mere fact of noncompliance with a court order. It prompts considerations 
other than the matter of an affront to the dignity of the court.”176 
Fueling the relatively new offender-funded model of criminal justice 
is not a fundamental obligation. Assessing LFOs, not to mention 
imprisoning LFO debtors for default, is a relatively recent 
phenomenon,
177
 while the obligation to support one’s family is 
timeless.
178
 Imprisonment for LFO nonpayment is not a “fundamental” 
obligation as was contemplated by Decker, calling Barklind’s holding 
into question. 
                                                     
172. Barklind, 87 Wash. 2d at 820, 557 P.2d at 319 (citing Decker, 52 Wash. 2d at 458, 326 P.2d 
at 333). 
173. See, e.g., Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the 
Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 384–86 (2012). This argument is outside of the 
scope of this Comment. 
174. For example, when drafting laws in the 1800s prohibiting imprisonment for debt, British 
Parliament maintained exceptions that allowed imprisonment for family support debts. Ware, supra 
note 35, at 362. This sentiment is reflected in early American cases. See, e.g., Audubon v. Shufeldt, 
181 U.S. 575, 577 (1901) (finding the payment of alimony to be a fundamental duty of the husband 
to support his wife); Andrew v. Andrew, 20 A. 817, 819 (1890) (declaring familial support debts to 
arise out of a fundamental duty of a man to support his wife and children); State v. King, 22 So. 
887, 889 (La. 1897) (calling familial support debts “of paramount importance to the welfare of 
society”). Each of these cases were cited favorably by the Washington Supreme Court in In Re 
Cave, 26 Wash. 213, 216, 66 P. 425, 427 (1901). The sentiment continues to be expressed in more 
modern Washington opinions. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d 255, 262–63, 634 P.2d 
877, 881 (1981) (discussing a child’s right to support as fundamental, longstanding, and “of greatest 
concern” to the state and court). 
175. Decker, 52 Wash. 2d at 458, 326 P.2d at 333. 
176. Id. at 458, 326 P.2d at 333. 
177. See Shapiro, supra note 5. Governments began adopting “tough-on-crime” policies in 1970. 
Id. As a result, costs of criminal justice systems increased eleven-fold from 1970–2000. Id. 
Struggling with budget deficits and pressure to avoid increasing taxes, legislatures began charging 
defendants “user fees,” which also increased over time. Id. 
178. For example, when limiting imprisonment for debt, Parliament consistently articulated 
family obligations as outside of any prohibitions, but did nothing to exempt debts owed to the state 
for costs related to prosecution or incarceration. See supra notes 53–54. 
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But, could it be that LFOs, like every debt owed to the government, 
are “fundamental” simply because they are owed to the public as a 
whole? No. Throughout most of Washington’s jurisprudence, the only 
financial obligations not protected from imprisonment were unpaid 
fines,
179
 taxes, and license fees.
180
 All other debts owed to the 
government, including costs and ordinary fees, were and are well within 
the purview of Washington’s and other states’ constitutional prohibitions 
on imprisonment for debt.
181
 The word “debt” should be used in its 
“popular and general sense”—requiring recognition of its 
capaciousness.
182
 “Obviously, it seems to us, [debt] was understood to 
signify obligations due from one person to another of every 
character.”183 The current Court should respect the breadth of the term 
“debt” and not allow the faulty status obligation reasoning underlying 
Barklind to work around the fundamental protection from imprisonment 
for debt.
184
 
Non-fine LFOs should be treated as “debts” under article I, section 
17. The question then becomes whether imprisonment for LFO 
nonpayment constitutes “imprisonment for debt.” If not for the case law 
interpreting this provision divergently,
185
 the answer would be a clear 
and simple “yes”: Non-fine LFOs are debts within article I, section 17 
and imprisonment for debt is facially unconstitutional unless a debtor is 
absconding.
186
 Although the constitution’s plain language makes no 
exception for LFO debts, non-absconding individuals are imprisoned for 
LFO default. Before discussing the case law abrogating this seemingly 
logical analysis, it is necessary to first understand the ideals embodied in 
                                                     
179. ROSENOW, supra note 148, at 507. 
180. Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 660–62, 30 P.2d 646, 648–49 (1934). 
181. State v. McFarland, 60 Wash. 98, 110 P. 792 (1910) (holding that article I, section 17 
protected the individual from being imprisoned for failing to pay an innkeeper fee); see 16A C.J.S. 
Constitutional Law § 710 (2005). 
182. Bronson v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 277, 152 P. 1039, 1044 (1915). 
183. Id. at 277–78, 152 P. at 1044. 
184. James, supra note 31, at 157 (“Courts and the federal government may attempt to put a new 
face on the old problem of debtors’ prisons by calling child support a ‘social obligation’ or by 
calling court orders ‘decrees’ rather than ‘debts,’ but if an individual is incarcerated for failure to 
pay money owed, then that individual is in a debtor’s prison.”). 
185. See infra notes 245–95 and accompanying text. 
186. See Bronson, 88 Wash. at 277, 152 P. at 1044 (“[Article I, section 17] is a simple declaration 
that there shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of absconding debtors. Nothing in the 
context or subject-matter indicates that it is otherwise limited, nor do we find elsewhere in the 
Constitution anything that indicates that it was intended to be otherwise limited.”); Burrichter v. 
Cline, 3 Wash. 135, 28 P. 367 (1891) (holding that arrest for failing to pay a private debt when the 
debtor was not absconding violated article I, section 17). 
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article I, section 17. These ideals reinforce the plain language 
interpretation discussed above while providing a foundation necessary to 
understand the provision’s interpretive jurisprudence. 
B. Imprisonment for Failing to Pay LFOs Is Contrary to the Populist 
Ideals Embodied in the Washington State Constitution and Article 
I, Section 17 
The Washington Constitution’s article I, section 17’s plain language 
makes no exception for LFO default and the purpose and policy 
embodied in the provision, as well as the history underlying its 
enactment, runs contrary to finding an implied exception. Washington’s 
article I, section 17 strongly protects individual liberties, exceeding the 
protection provided by many other state provisions.
187
 As with much of 
the Washington Constitution’s bill of rights, article I, section 17 is a 
provision espousing populist ideals
188
 and must be interpreted with a 
mind for its unusual strength and an eye towards protecting individual 
liberties from State infringement.
189
 Reading “debt” to exclude LFOs 
grants the government an implied right to meddle in personal affairs and 
fails to respect the populist ideals espoused in Washington’s 
Constitution. 
Washington’s bill of rights is robust, encompassing the values of the 
populist movement prevalent during the time of the framing.
190
 
Occupying a large majority of Washington Territory politics, the 
populist movement emphasized individual liberties, focusing on limiting 
the state’s ability to exercise its power on individual citizens.191 
Concerned about special interests controlling government, as well as 
power concentrations in the economically elite, the delegates crafted a 
constitution that strongly protected the working class’ personal 
liberties.
192
 Although some provisions have changed, the Washington 
Constitution still prioritizes individual liberties, respecting the populist 
                                                     
187. Although most constitutional prohibitions on imprisonment for debt only apply to debts 
arising out of contract, 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 711 (2005), Washington’s provision also 
applies to debts arising from tort judgments. Bronson, 88 Wash. at 277–79, 152 P. at 244. 
188. See Hugh Spitzer, The Past and Present Populist State, in THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF 
AMERICAN STATES 771, 777 (George E. Connor & Christopher W. Hammons eds., 2008). 
189. See id. at 771 (“[T]he sensibilities, concerns, and ideology entrenched in an original 
constitution continuously influence court interpretations of that document.”). 
190. See id. (“Washington’s 1889 Constitution was, and remains, overwhelmingly ‘populist’ in 
its orientation, content, and practical effect.”). 
191. Id. at 777. 
192. Id. at 772. 
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sentiment so pervasive in 1889.
193
 Interpreting article I, section 17 to 
respect its populist roots would limit the state’s powers to infringe on 
individual liberties to only those expressly allowed by the provision. 
Information regarding the 1889 convention suggests the delegates 
quickly passed article I, section 17 after only minor alteration.
194
 This 
quick passage combined with a lack of recorded debate suggests there 
was little disagreement, further implying that the drafters intended the 
provision to be consistent with the underlying principles defining the 
populist movement and the political ideals of the delegates.
195
 
State constitutions routinely borrow provisions from other states.
196
 
The Washington delegates’ intentional deviations from other states’ 
provisions, particularly those that come from “sister states,” evince what 
each provision was intended to mean.
197
 Because the transcript of the 
Washington constitutional convention has potentially been destroyed, it 
is unclear from where article I, section 17 was derived.
198
 However, the 
provision is nearly identical to a draft authored by W. Lair Hill 
submitted to the 1889 convention: “There shall be no imprisonment for 
debt, except in cases of debt and absconding debtors.”199 Hill likely 
derived his provision from the Oregon Constitution, which provides: 
“There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in case of fraud or 
absconding debtors.”200 
Article I, section 17, while reflecting the flavor of these two 
provisions, mirrors neither of them identically.
201
 The minor divergences 
                                                     
193. Id. (“The state’s anti-special-interest constitution has not changed appreciably during the 
past century.”). 
194. ROSENOW, supra note 148, at 507. 
195. See Spitzer, supra note 188, at 772–73 (discussing the populist movement pervasive at the 
time in the minds of the Washington delegates and citizens). 
196. See G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1169, 1190–91 
(1992) (calling state constitutional drafters more likely “borrowers—at times, unabashed 
plagiarists—than creators”). 
197. Id. 
198. ROSENOW, supra note 148, at vii. 
199. W. LAIR HILL, A CONSTITUTION ADAPTED TO THE COMING STATE: SUGGESTIONS BY HON. 
W. LAIR HILL: MAIN FEATURES CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF MODERN EXPERIENCE 21 (1889). 
200.  OR. CONST. art. I, § 19 (1859). Due to Washington’s close ties with Oregon, and the fact 
that W. Lair Hill hailed from Oregon, much of Washington’s Constitution was derived from 
Oregon’s. ROSENOW, supra note 148, at 506 n.27. Oregon’s constitutional prohibition on 
imprisonment for debt was likely derived from Indiana’s but the delegation substantially altered the 
language of the Indiana provision, creating a much more succinct and robust prohibition. See also 
Claudia Burton & Andrew Grade, A Legislative History of the Oregon Constitution of 1857—Part I, 
37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 469, 484, 530–32 (2001); IND. CONST. art. I, § 22.  
201. Compare WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17, with OR. CONST. art. I, § 19. See also HILL, supra note 
199, at 21 (1889). Twenty years after the constitutional convention, the Washington State Supreme 
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serve only to make Washington’s provision more robust. By removing 
the second “debt” in W. Lair Hill’s draft, the delegates narrowed cases in 
which debtors could be imprisoned by articulating an unambiguous bar 
unless the debtor was absconding.
202
 Similarly, if the delegates began 
with the Oregon version then removed “fraud,” they eliminated a 
potentially broad exception, codifying their intent to allow imprisonment 
only when the debtor was absconding. The delegates intended this 
provision to be powerful: Although most provisions apply only to 
contractual debts,
203
 for nearly one hundred years, article I, section 17 
has applied more broadly, encompassing judgments in tort.
204
 
*     *     * 
It is at worst unclear whether article I, section 17 protects from 
imprisonment for LFO default. “[I]mprisonment for debt is not favored, 
and in the enforcement of the constitutional guaranty, every doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the liberty of the citizen.”205 Accordingly, 
the Washington State Supreme Court should interpret the prohibition on 
imprisonment for debt broadly to protect citizens from imprisonment for 
LFO default—resolving every doubt in favor of Washingtonians’ 
personal liberty. Furthermore, imprisonment for LFO default runs 
contrary to populist ideals. “It is elementary that personal liberty 
transcends the obligation to pay a monetary sum in most 
circumstances.”206 As one early Washington State Supreme Court 
explained: 
Imprisonment for debt is abhorrent to the spirit of free 
government, and is not to be tolerated under the form of penal 
statutes. That no man shall oppress his debtor or restrain him of 
his liberty has come to be a fixed principle, cherished by the 
                                                     
Court interpreted article I, section 17 to allow imprisonment for fraud. In re Milecke, 52 Wash. 312, 
100 P. 743 (1909). This could imply that Washington’s provision was intended to be functionally 
identical to Oregon’s. However, the Court’s holding did not rest on an argument that Washington 
delegates intended the provision to be read narrowly or to impliedly include an exception for fraud. 
Instead, the court explained that the case was essentially a criminal issuethe individual could be 
imprisoned because of his criminal action: partaking in the comforts of an inn with the intent to 
defraud. Id. at 317, 100 P. at 744–45; see infra Part V.C.1. That the provision was functionally 
revised by the Court twenty years after the constitution was ratified does not refute the argument 
that article I, section 17 was intended by the delegates to be a strong and broad prohibition. 
202. See HILL, supra note 199. 
203. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 711 (2005). 
204. Bronson v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 277–79, 152 P. 1039, 1044 (1915). 
205. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 710 (2005). 
206. State v. Barklind, 87 Wash. 2d 814, 819, 557 P.2d 314, 318 (1976) (citing In re Milecke, 52 
Wash. 312, 100 P. 743 (1909)). 
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people, and so guarded by constitutional provisions that the 
Legislature cannot give ear to those who seek to use the power 
of the state to coerce the payment of their debts.
207
 
Using contempt proceedings to avoid article I, section 17 nullifies the 
provision’s plain language and the laudable populist goals it espouses208 
and puts a creative slant on an expressly unconstitutional practice. Yet 
litigants are not using article I, section 17 to combat the current 
system.
209
 Why aren’t advocates utilizing this provision to challenge 
potentially egregious violations of a constitutional liberty? The answer 
likely lies in the evolution of article I, section 17’s jurisprudence. 
C.  Case Law Has Abrogated the Constitutional Provision’s Power to 
Protect Individuals From Imprisonment for Debt 
In construing article I, section 17 the Washington State Supreme 
Court has significantly diverged from the provision’s text and sentiment. 
This Comment explains that divergence by separating the jurisprudence 
into three distinct eras. Although the Court began by robustly protecting 
the liberties expounded in article I, section 17 in the First Era, it 
gradually eroded individual rights, carving out an exception for family 
support obligations in the Second Era and qualifying the provision, 
predicating prohibition on the nature or intent of imprisonment. This 
corrosion has snowballed in the Third Era, rendering article I, section 17 
into a mere shell of the protection embodied by the unambiguous text. 
1.  In the First Era, the Court Robustly Protected the Prohibition on 
Imprisonment for Debt 
In Washington’s infancy, the Court focused primarily on the 
distinction between punishing criminal intent and coercing payment. In 
each case implicating article I, section 17, the Court condemned 
imprisonment for defaulting on a civil debt.
210
 Instead, the Court allowed 
                                                     
207. Milecke, 52 Wash. at 315, 100 P. at 744. 
208. See supra notes 140–204 and accompanying text. 
209. See, e.g., Cavnar v. Bounceback, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00235-RMP, 2015 WL 4429095 (E.D. 
Wash. July 18, 2014) (consumer protection laws); Rucker v. Spokane Cty., No. CV-12-5157-LRS, 
slip op. at *6 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 26, 2013) (due process); State v. Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d 82, 344 
P.3d 680 (2015) (due process); State v. Nason, 168 Wash. 2d 936, 948, 233 P.3d 848, 853 (2010) 
(due process); State v. Nash, No. 38514-7-II, 2011 WL 198695, at *1, *3–4 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 
2011);. In fact, one scholar even suggests that it is unlikely the current practice of incarceration for 
failing to pay LFOs can be constrained by article I, section 17. Giessen, supra note 80, at 551 n.32. 
210. See, e.g., Bronson v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 286, 152 P. 1039, 1046 (1915) (refusing to 
imprison an individual for defaulting on a civil judgment); State v. McFarland, 60 Wash. 98, 104–
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imprisonment only when used to penalize criminal or fraudulent 
action.
211
 These early Washington State Supreme Court opinions suggest 
the strong language and populist ideals espoused in the article I, section 
17 indicate that the drafters intended a robust protection. 
Burrichter v. Cline
212
 is one of the earliest opinions construing article 
I, section 17. Written two years after the Washington constitutional 
convention and signed by leading delegates,
213
 the opinion considered a 
debtor’s arrest for failing to pay a private obligation.214 Finding 
insufficient evidence that the individual had attempted to abscond, the 
Court found that jailing him was “illegal and improvident” under article 
I, section 17.
215
 The Court took the constitutional provision at its word: 
Imprisonment for debt is per se unconstitutional unless the debtor is 
absconding.
216
 
The Court first explained that the provision did not apply to punitive 
fines in Colby v. Backus.
217
 In Colby, the Court examined a statute 
allowing judges to impose the costs of criminal prosecution upon an 
individual bringing a frivolous complaint and imprison the complainant 
until the fine was paid.
218
 Characterizing the fine as a criminal penalty 
and thus not as civil debt, the Court found that imprisonment would not 
violate the Constitution.
219
 
The Court first diverged from its respectful deference to the 
provision’s unequivocal language in In re Milecke,220 a case that dealt 
                                                     
05, 110 P. 792, 794 (1910) (refusing to imprison an individual for failing to pay inspection fees); 
Burrichter v. Cline, 3 Wash. 135, 136–37, 28 P. 367, 368 (1891) (refusing to imprison a non-
absconding individual for failing to pay a private debt). 
211. In re Milecke, 52 Wash. 312, 317, 100 P. 743, 743–44 (1909) (allowing imprisonment for 
using false pretenses to obtain food and lodging from an inn without payment); Colby v. Backus, 19 
Wash. 347, 348–49, 53 P. 367, 367–68 (1898) (allowing imprisonment for failing to pay a criminal 
fine assessed for engaging in frivolous prosecution). 
212. 3 Wash. 135, 28 P. 367 (1891). 
213. The opinion was authored by Justice Theodore Stiles, a delegate. ROSENOW, supra note 147, 
at 485. The opinion was also signed by Justice Hoyt, the president of the constitutional convention. 
Id. at 465. 
214. Burrichter, 3 Wash. at 136–37, 28 P. at 368.  
215. Id. at 136, 28 P. at 368. 
216. Id. 
217. 19 Wash. 347, 53 P. 367 (1898). 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 349, 53 P. at 367 (“These costs are cast upon him as a penalty. They do not constitute 
strictly and simply a debtin the technical sense of the wordany more than the fine imposed 
upon a party convicted of assault and battery, is a debt.” (quoting In re Ebenhack, 17 Kan. 618 
(1877))). 
220. 52 Wash. 312, 100 P. 743 (1909). 
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with a statute authorizing imprisonment of any individual who, using 
false pretenses, obtained food or lodging from a boarding house without 
payment.
221
 Although the court admitted article I, section 17 only 
mentions absconding debtors and makes no express exemptions for 
fraud, the Court decided that imprisonment for fraudulent conduct 
resulting in debt did not offend the Washington Constitution.
222
 The 
Court’s decision turned on the character of the punishment: The 
defendant was being punished for intentionally pursuing a course of 
fraudulent conduct, not for accruing an unpaid debt.
223
 As in Colby, the 
Court’s concern seems to hinge on the distinction between punishing 
malicious intent and coercing payment. The Court also emphasized the 
importance of the protection embodied in article I, section 17.
224
 
Soon after deciding Milecke, the Court took the opportunity to further 
emphasize article I, section 17’s importance. State v. McFarland225 held 
unconstitutional a portion of a statute punishing innkeepers for refusing 
to pay inspection fees.
226
 The Court reasoned that a statute providing 
imprisonment for “a mere failure to pay” offended article I, section 
17.
227
 Although the opinion is quite short, this decision, too, seems to 
turn on the existence—or lack thereof—of malicious intent: “The only 
alleged criminal offense, with the commission of which the appellant has 
been charged, is that he did not pay the inspection fee. He cannot be 
fined or imprisoned for any such act, as it cannot be made a criminal 
offense.”228 
The Court once again respected the clear language in article I, section 
17 in Bronson v. Syverson.
229
 The defendant defaulted on a significant 
civil judgment entered against him, causing the plaintiff to obtain a writ 
of execution from the trial court mandating the defendant’s 
                                                     
221. Id. at 314, 100 P. at 744. 
222. Id. at 315–16, 100 P. at 745. 
223. Id. at 317, 100 P. at 745. 
224. The Court stated: 
Imprisonment for debt is abhorrent to the spirit of free government, and is not to be tolerated 
under the form of penal statutes. That no man shall oppress his debtor or restrain him of his 
liberty has come to be a fixed principle, cherished by the people, and so guarded by 
constitutional provisions that the Legislature cannot give ear to those who seek to use the 
power to the state to coerce the payment of their debts. 
Id. at 315, 100 P. at 744. 
225. 60 Wash. 98, 110 P. 792 (1910). 
226. Id. at 99–101, 105, 110 P. at 792, 794. 
227. Id. at 105, 110 P. at 794 (citing Hubbell v. Higgins, 126 N.W. 914, 918 (1910)). 
228. Id. 
229. 88 Wash. 264, 152 P. 1039 (1915). 
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imprisonment.
230
 The defendant could be discharged only by satisfying 
the judgment.
231
 Indicative of its respect for the clear wording of the 
provision, the Court took a textual approach to construing article I, 
section 17: 
[I]t is a cardinal rule of construction that the language of a state 
Constitution, more than that of any other of the written laws, is 
to be taken in its general and ordinary sense . . . . “Every word 
employed in the Constitution is to be expounded in its plain, 
obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some 
ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.”232 
Thus, the Court held, except in cases of absconding debtors, the 
Constitution, by its plain meaning, absolutely barred imprisonment for 
civil debts.
233
 On that ground, the Court refused to uphold the 
defendant’s imprisonment, even though he had failed to comply with a 
court-ordered judgment.
234
 
When one examines these cases together, a foundational 
interpretation of article I, section 17 begins to emerge. In Milecke, 
imprisonment for fraudulently failing to pay for food and lodging at an 
inn did not violate the prohibition on imprisonment for debt.
235
 The debt 
was arguably incidental to the defendant’s wrongdoing—it was the 
fraudulent act that offended the Court. In contrast, McFarland held that 
imprisonment for failing to pay an innkeeper fee was unconstitutional.
236
 
The Court explained that, absent a finding of fraud in incurring the debt 
in the first place, imprisonment violated article I, section 17.
237
 The 
Legislature could mandate payment, but it could not mandate 
imprisonment for failing to pay absent a finding of fraud.
238
 In Bronson, 
the court held that an individual could not be imprisoned for failing to 
pay a court ordered judgment.
239
 Because the debtor’s ability to obtain 
                                                     
230. Id. at 264–65, 152 P. at 1039. 
231. Id. at 269, 152 P. at 1041. 
232. Id. at 275, 152 P. at 1043 (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES § 451 (1891)). 
233. Id. at 277, 152 P. at 1043 (“[Article I, section 17] is a simple declaration that there shall be 
no imprisonment for debt except in cases of absconding debtors. Nothing in the context or subject-
matter indicates that it is otherwise limited, nor do we find elsewhere in the constitution anything 
that indicates that it was intended to be otherwise limited.”). 
234. 88 Wash. at 284, 152 P. at 1046. 
235. 52 Wash. 312, 316–17, 100 P. 743, 744–75 (1909). 
236. State v. McFarland, 60 Wash. 98, 104, 110 P. 792, 794 (1910). 
237. Id. at 104–05, 110 P. at 794. 
238. Id. 
239. Bronson, 88 Wash. at 283–84, 152 P. at 1046. 
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freedom was predicated on his payment of the debt, the Constitution had 
been violated.
240
 
The crux of the reasoning underlying these cases is this: An 
individual could not avoid imprisonment for a criminal or fraudulent act 
just because it resulted in a debt.
241
 In cases where the court allowed 
imprisonment, the fraud or criminal act created the debt.
242
 The fraud or 
criminal act itself was not the mere nonpayment of a pre-existing debt.
243
 
Defendants could be penalized for the initial criminal or fraudulent act 
notwithstanding article I, section 17. But, if the fraudulent or criminal 
act was mere nonpayment of a pre-existing debt, the individual could not 
be imprisoned unless they were absconding.
244
 
Nearly all of the Court’s opinions during the First Era respected the 
strong language of article I, section 17. However, during this time the 
Court also provided the foundation for an implied exception—what this 
Comment will call the family support obligation exception. In re Cave
245
 
gave short shrift to an argument that jailing the defendant for unpaid 
alimony
246
 was imprisonment for debt
247
 by holding that alimony is not 
“debt” under article I, section 17.248 The Court relied on “well-settled 
law” declaring alimony to be something other than a debt, citing only 
                                                     
240. Id. at 269–70, 152 P. at 1041. 
241. In re Milecke, 52 Wash. at 317, 100 P. at 745 (“The offense consists, not in the creation of a 
debt, nor in its nonpayment, but rather in the fraud through which credit may be procured or 
payment evaded. The latter, and not the former, is the thing for which punishment is to be inflicted.” 
(quoting State v. Yardley, 32 S.W. 481, 484 (Tenn. 1895))). 
242. See, e.g., id. 
243. See, e.g., id. 
244. Burrichter et al. v. Cline, 3 Wash. 135, 28 P. 367 (1891) (noting that an individual may not 
be imprisoned for failing to pay a debt unless they are found by the court to be absconding). 
245. 26 Wash. 213, 66 P. 425 (1901). 
246. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 89 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “alimony” as court ordered support 
for one’s separated spouse). 
247. In re Cave, 26 Wash. at 216, 66 P. at 426 (dedicating only forty words of actual text to 
dismissing the argument). 
248. Id. Although the holding of this case is clear and concise, predicated entirely on cases 
focusing on the fundamental nature of family support obligations, the Court later attempted to 
retroactively revise the holding:  
[T]he real ground of the decision is that imprisonment can be used as a means of coercing the 
performance of the order of the court; to compel the defendant to do a thing which was in his 
power to do; not as a punishment for a failure to satisfy a judgment of alimony which he had 
no means of satisfying. 
Bronson v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 272, 152 P. 1039, 1042 (1915). The Court did not cite any 
portion of Cave to support this assertion. The Washington State Court of Appeals later used this 
characterization in Britannia Holdings Ltd. v. Greer, 127 Wash. App. 926, 931, 113 P.3d 1041, 
1044 (2005), to find imprisonment for failing to pay a contractual debt would not offend article I, 
section 17 as long as the court found the default was willful. Id. at 934, 113 P.3d at 1045. 
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cases from the federal courts
249
 and state courts in Illinois,
250
 Vermont,
251
 
and Louisiana.
252
 Each case cited by the Court predicated its holding on 
the fundamental duty of the husband to support his wife.
253
 The Court 
did not significantly revisit its holding until nearly fifty years later.
254
 
When examined in tandem, Cave and the other foundational holdings 
can be boiled down to a simple two-step test: (1) is this a debt within 
article I, section 17; and (2) if so, is this (a) imprisonment for failing to 
pay a previously incurred debt (impermissible); or is it (b) punishing 
fraudulent or criminal conduct that resulted in a debt (permissible)? This 
test is compelling in its simplicity. Although this test can be recognized 
driving the reasoning in many opinions, subsequent courts have unduly 
complicated its application. 
2. In the Second Era, the Court Began Carving out an Exception for 
Support Debts and Positing a Distinction Between Contempt and 
Civil Default 
During the Second Era, the Court began chipping away at the strong 
prohibition on imprisonment for debt it had emphasized in Milecke and 
its progeny, allowing imprisonment for failure to pay business and 
occupations taxes
255
 and failure to pay debts imposed by divorce 
                                                     
249. Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 (1901). This case examined whether alimony was 
dischargeable under the current bankruptcy act. Id. at 576. The Court explained that alimony “is not 
founded on contract, express or implied, but on the natural and legal duty of the husband to support 
the wife.” Id. at 577. The Court held, “alimony cannot be regarded as a debt owing from the 
husband to the wife, and, not being so, cannot be discharged by an order in the bankruptcy court.” 
Id. at 580. 
250. Barclay v. Barclay, 56 N.E. 636, 637 (Ill. 1900) (“The liability to pay alimony is not 
founded upon a contract, but is a penalty imposed for a failure to perform a duty . . . . [A]limony 
cannot be regarded as a debt owing from the husband to the wife.”).  
251. Andrew v. Andrew, 20 A. 817, 819 (Vt. 1890) (“[The right to collect familial support debts] 
grows out of the domestic relations of the parties. It is the duty of the husband to support the wife. 
That duty does not cease upon the dissolution of the marriage for his misconduct. It is the duty of 
the father to provide for his children. He is not relieved from that duty when their custody is given 
to the mother.”). 
252. State v. King, 22 So. 887, 889 (La. 1897) (“[Alimony obligations are,] in no sense of the 
word, ‘debts’ due by the spouses; they are simply recognized legal duties, which it is of paramount 
importance to the welfare of society . . . . An order for alimony in a divorce suit is nothing more 
than the judicial sanction and enforcement . . . of the duty by the husband to support the wife.”). 
253. See supra notes 249–52. 
254. The Washington State Supreme Court continued to hold that alimony was not a “debt” under 
the Constitution, see, e.g., Haakenson v. Coldiron, 190 Wash. 627, 629, 70 P.2d 294, 295 (1937), 
but no robust opinion was provided until the late 1950s in Decker v. Decker, 52 Wash. 2d 456, 326 
P.2d 332 (1958).  
255. Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 30 P.2d 646 (1934). 
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courts.
256
 These holdings provide the foundation upon which modern 
courts rely when imprisoning individuals for LFO nonpayment. In 
Austin v. City of Seattle,
257
 the Court considered a statute imprisoning 
individuals for failing to pay the city’s business and occupations tax.258 
Recognizing the factual similarities to McFarland, the Court attempted 
to distinguish the two cases, arguing that in McFarland the statute 
[D]id not make it unlawful to operate a hotel without paying the 
inspection fee. Under the ordinance here involved, it is unlawful 
to engage in the proscribed business without paying the tax and 
obtaining a license. That is the very essence of the offense which 
is made the subject of punishment.
259
 
Imprisonment was not being used to coerce payment, it was instead 
being used to punish noncompliance with the ordinance.
260
 At first, this 
seems right in line with Milecke, which allowed punishment of 
fraudulent conduct.
261
 However, Austin takes the Milekce reasoning a 
step farther. In Milecke, an individual did not violate the statute unless 
she used “false pretenses”—i.e. acted fraudulently.262 This emphasis on 
fraud is supported by McFarland, which held unconstitutional a statute 
that did not contain language limiting violations to fraudulent acts, 
instead allowing imprisonment for “mere failure to pay.”263 The 
ordinances involved in McFarland and Austin are functionally 
indistinguishable: they both allow for imprisonment for failing to pay a 
tax or fee, and both defendants were punished for violating the word of 
law. Nonetheless, McFarland and Austin reached entirely different 
results. 
However, the Austin Court’s primary holding was that taxes and 
license fees were not protected by article I, section 17.
264
 This Court’s 
reasoning, which slightly tweaks the foundational two-step described 
above, may be where the current jurisprudence allowing imprisonment 
under the guise of contempt was born. 
In the cases following Austin, the Court further compromised article I, 
                                                     
256. Decker, 52 Wash. 2d at 457, 326 P.2d at 332; Brantley v. Brantley, 54 Wash. 2d 717, 344 
P.2d 731 (1959).  
257. 176 Wash. 654, 30 P.2d 646 (1934). 
258. Id. at 655–56, 30 P.2d at 647. 
259. Id. at 661, 30 P.2d at 649.  
260. Id. 
261. See supra notes 220–24 and accompanying text. 
262. In re Milecke, 52 Wash. 312, 317, 100 P. 743, 745 (1909). 
263. State v. McFarland, 60 Wash. 98, 105, 110 P. 792, 794 (1910). 
264. Austin, 176 Wash. at 660, 30 P.2d at 648. 
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section 17. In Decker the defendant was imprisoned for failing to pay 
community debts imposed on him by a court-ordered divorce decree.
265
 
The Court first explained that because public policy supports expedient 
settlement of divorce disputes, article I, section 17 did not apply to 
family obligations.
266
 The Court briefly discussed contempt powers, but 
it predicated its holding on an overarching concern regarding the 
fundamental nature of family support obligations.
267
 Of course, this 
decision was not without dissent, as three justices challenged the notion 
that an individual could have the power to imprison their former spouse 
for failing to pay a debt to a third party.
268
 
Similarly, in Brantley v. Brantley,
269
 a divorce court ordered the 
defendant to pay his marital community’s debts owed to third party 
creditors.
270
 When he defaulted, he was imprisoned for contempt.
271
 The 
court reached the same result obtained in Decker, again basing its 
opinion entirely on the unique nature of family support debts:
272
 
[T]he significant question to be determined is whether the 
provision that the court seeks to enforce by contempt 
proceedings, regardless of the name given it, bears a reasonable 
relationship to the husband’s duty to support his wife and 
                                                     
265. 52 Wash. 2d 456, 457, 326 P.2d 332 (1958). 
266. Id. at 458, 326 P.2d at 333. 
267. Id. (stating that failing to comply with a court order “involves considerably more than the 
mere fact of noncompliance with a court order. It prompts considerations other than the matter of an 
affront to the dignity of the court—which in itself is serious enough” (emphasis added)).  
268. Id. at 467–70, 326 P.2d at 338–39 (1958) (Mallery, J., dissenting). 
269. 54 Wash. 2d 717, 344 P.2d 731 (1959). 
270. Id. at 718, 344 P.2d at 732. 
271. Id. 
272. Unlike in Decker, the Brantley Court did not tie this analysis to the word “debt,” instead 
arguing that the prohibition did not pertain to the equitable powers of divorce court. Brantley, 54 
Wash. 2d at 719–20, 344 P.3d at 732–33. Thus, the Court was convinced that “Art. I, § 17, of our 
constitution, simply was not designed to thwart or prevent a proper exercise of the equity power and 
discretion of our divorce courts.” Id. at 719, 344 P.2d at 732–33 (emphasis added). At least one 
court has embraced the unique reasoning in Brantley, attempting to extend it to include contempt in 
all proceedings. State ex rel. Daly v. Snyder, 117 Wash. App. 602, 609–10, 72 P.3d 780, 783 
(2003). However, the Snyder court was examining imprisonment for failing to pay child support 
under article I, section 17. Id. at 604–05, 72 P.3d at 780–81. Family obligation debts are not within 
the purview of the provision due to their unique fundamental nature and the court’s attempt to 
extend the equitable decree argument should be limited to its facts. Subsequent courts have 
generally not relied upon the “equitable decree” argument proffered by the Brantley court. Instead, 
their holdings are predicated on either determining the obligation is not a debt, see, e.g., State v. 
Barklind, 87 Wash. 2d 814, 820, 557 P.2d 314, 319 (1976), or articulating a distinction between 
imprisoning an individual, not for owing a debt, but for failing to comply with a court order to pay a 
pre-existing debt, see, e.g., id. at 819, 557 P.2d at 318; Britannia Holdings Ltd. v. Greer, 127 Wash. 
App. 926, 932–33, 113 P.3d 1041, 1044 (2005). 
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children. If it does, it does not fall within the constitutional 
prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
273
 
Even this holding—which was more clearly based on the unique nature 
of family support debts than was Decker—was not without dissent: 
  It is not the prerogative of the court to change the universally 
accepted meaning of the English language. We are here 
concerned with an order for the payment of debts and an order 
of imprisonment for contempt of court. . . .  
. . . .  
  I prefer the theory that the constitutional prohibition against 
imprisonment for debt deprives the court of the power to make 
any order respecting a debt if the contemplated method of 
enforcement is by imprisonment.
274
 
During the Second Era, the Court chipped away at the strong 
protection provided by article I, section 17. However, it did not do so in 
a coherent way. The clearest contribution made by these cases is that 
“debt” under the Constitution does not include family support debts or 
debts owed to third parties in connection with family support 
obligations.
275
 Although the Court also attempted to distinguish between 
punitive imprisonment for violating a statute or court order and coercive 
imprisonment for failing to pay a debt,
276
 this distinction was contested 
by justices both in dissent and majority.
277
 However, the arguably 
extraneous
278
 contempt-versus-civil-debt analyses erected a platform off 
                                                     
273. Brantley, 54 Wash. 2d at 721, 344 P.2d at 734. 
274. Id. at 54 Wash. 2d at 723, 344 P.2d at 734–35 (1959) (Mallery, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original). 
275. Brantley, 54 Wash. 2d at 721, 344 P.2d at 734 (“[T]he significant question to be determined 
is whether the provision that the court seeks to enforce by contempt proceedings, regardless of the 
name given it, bears a reasonable relationship to the husband’s duty to support his wife and 
children. If the [sic] does, it does not fall within the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment 
for debt.”); Decker v. Decker, 52 Wash. 2d 456, 458, 326 P.2d 332, 333 (1958) (“It has been clear 
in this state for over fifty years that arrearages in alimony and support payments do not constitute a 
debt within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.”); In re Cave, 26 Wash. 213, 216, 66 P. 
425, 426 (1901) (“It is the well-settled law of this country that a decree or order for alimony in a 
divorce proceeding is not a debt, within the meaning of that term as used in section 17 of article 1 of 
our constitution.”). 
276. See, e.g., Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 661–62, 30 P.2d 646, 649 (1934). 
277. Brantley, 54 Wash. 2d at 721, 344 P.2d at 734 (1959) (seemingly rejecting the contempt-
versus-civil-debt distinction raised briefly in Decker by predicating its holding solely on the 
equitable nature of family support debts). 
278. In both Austin, 176 Wash. 654, 30 P.2d 646, and Decker, 52 Wash. 2d 456, 326 P.2d 332, 
the contempt/ordinance violation versus civil debt distinction was a secondary discussion or 
alternative holding. Austin, 176 Wash. at 660–62, 30 P.3d at 649 (holding that taxes and license fees 
are not debts within the constitution, but then stating “the misdemeanor consists in a refusal to obey 
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which future courts dove, rendering the provision a mere shell of the 
protection set forth in the First Era. 
3.  In the Third Era, the Court Expanded the Family Support Debt 
and Fraud Exceptions Significantly, Further Debilitating Article I, 
Section 17 
In the 1970s, the United States began experiencing an unprecedented 
crime wave and most states, including Washington, adopted a “tough on 
crime” attitude and the “offender funded” model of criminal justice.279 
Similarly, the Court took a tougher stance on offenders, failing to treat 
the contempt-versus-civil-debt distinction as contested. In this third and 
final era, the Court relied heavily on contempt proceedings to effectively 
hamstring article I, section 17. 
In Barklind, the Court held that, although it is “elementary that 
personal liberty transcends the obligation to pay a monetary sum in most 
circumstances,” a defendant could be jailed for willfully failing to pay 
court ordered public defenders fees.
280
 The Court reasoned the defendant 
was not jailed for owing the county, but was jailed for failing to comply 
with a court order demanding payment.
281
 
Lower courts did not necessarily endorse this hard-line approach to 
imprisonment for debt. In State v. Enloe,
282
 the Washington State Court 
of Appeals invalidated a statute allowing imprisonment for intentionally 
failing to pay for agricultural products.
283
 Emphasizing that “[c]riminal 
statutes involving a deprivation of liberty must be strictly construed 
against the State,” the court endorsed the approach expounded by 
Milecke and its progeny, explaining that fraud resulting in debt was an 
imprisonable offense, while mere willful failure to pay was not.
284
 
                                                     
the provisions of the ordinance, and the fine authorized to be imposed upon conviction is not 
intended as a payment of the license tax, but as a punishment for defying the commands of the 
ordinance”); Decker, 52 Wash. 2d at 458–65, 326 P.2d at 333–37 (holding that alimony is not a 
“debt” within article I, section 17, but then engaging in additional analysis discussing cases in non-
familial-debt contexts). In each case, the Court could have settled the issue with only its first 
holding: The obligations at issue (penalties and fines in Austin, familial debts in Decker) were not 
“debts” within article I, section 17. Id. Given the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, there is an 
argument that the Austin and Decker Courts should not have delved into any additional secondary or 
alternative analyses. 
279. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text. 
280. 87 Wash. 2d 814, 819–20, 557 P.2d 314, 318–19 (1976). 
281. Id.  
282. 47 Wash. App. 165, 734 P.2d 520 (1987). 
283. Id. at 166, 734 P.2d at 521. 
284. Id. at 170–72, 734 P.2d at 523–24. 
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Mirroring Enloe’s approach, the Washington State Supreme Court 
also refused to imprison a defendant for taking his own vehicle from a 
mechanic’s shop without paying for services.285 Absent proof of a 
mechanic’s lien, taking the car was no more than defaulting on a 
contractual debt and did not rise to the level of theft.
286
 Imprisonment 
would thus violate article I, section 17.
287
 Finding that the statute did not 
require fraud and thus offended the Constitution, the Court explained, 
“[w]e are loath to turn the criminal justice system into a mechanism for 
the collection of private debts . . . . Although it is acceptable to imprison 
for fraud, one cannot be imprisoned merely for failure to pay a debt.”288 
It is telling that that the Court took a lenient approach in this case, when 
the offender-funded model of criminal justice was not implicated. The 
stark contrast between Pike and Barklind demonstrates the influence that 
Washington’s “tough on crime” attitude had on the Court and its article 
I, section 17 jurisprudence. 
The varied Washington State Supreme Court decisions interpreting 
article I, section 17 have led the Washington State Courts of Appeals to 
author at least two opinions pushing the boundaries of the contempt-
versus-civil-debt distinction. In State ex rel. Daly v. Snyder,
289
 the court 
of appeals upheld imprisonment for failing to pay child support, even 
after the child had reached adulthood.
290
 Relying on the contempt-
versus-civil-debt-distinction, the court emphasized that civil contempt 
was not being used to punish, which would be improper, but was instead 
being used to induce remedial behavior, which is permitted.
291
 This 
seems to be an inverse approach to the contempt-versus-civil-debt 
distinction examined by Barklind, which predicated valid imprisonment 
on punishing bad behavior rather than compelling payment. Nonetheless, 
because the litigants successfully framed the imprisonment as contempt, 
jailing the defendant for failing to pay was constitutionally permissible. 
                                                     
285. State v. Pike, 118 Wash. 2d 585, 587–88, 826 P.2d 152, 153 (1992). 
286. Id. at 595, 826 P.2d at 157. 
287. Id. 
288. Id. 
289. 117 Wash. App. 602, 72 P.3d 780 (2003). 
290. State ex rel. Daly v. Snyder, 117 Wash. App. 602, 604–05, 610, 72 P.3d 780, 780–81, 783 
(2003). 
291. Id. at 606, 82 P.3d at 781 (citing In re Interests of M.B., 101 Wash. App. 425, 439, 3 P.3d 
780 (2000) (“A coercive sanction is justified only on the theory that it will induce a specific act that 
the court has the right to coerce . . . should it become clear that the civil sanction will not produce 
the desired result, the justification for the civil sanction disappears. Further incarceration can be 
justified as a punishment for disobeying the court’s orders, but only after a criminal proceeding.”). 
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In Britannia Holdings Ltd. v. Greer,
292
 the Washington State Court of 
Appeals examined a court order requiring the defendants pay their 
private debt within four months or be jailed.
293
 Just as in Snyder, the 
court rested its decision on the coercive nature of its use of contempt: “It 
has long been settled . . . that coercive imprisonment for contumacious 
refusal to obey a lawful order to pay money is not imprisonment for 
debt.”294 “Where a court orders a party to deliver money or property in 
supplemental proceedings and the party is able but refuses to comply, a 
remedial contempt order imposing imprisonment does not violate the 
constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.”295 Mirroring 
the federal due process analysis expounded in Bearden v. Georgia,
296
 the 
Court held that, as long as an individual is able to pay, imprisonment for 
failing to respect a court order mandating payment does not violate the 
constitution.
297
 
D.  Opinions Handed down in the Third Era Do Not Stand on Strong 
Foundation 
So, what does article I, section 17 stand for? If one accepts Third Era 
opinions at face value, one must accept that the judiciary has rewritten 
article I, section 17, departing both from its original text and purpose and 
from the Court’s early interpretation. In essence, opinions handed down 
in the Second and Third Eras have changed the provision from stating 
“[t]here shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in cases of absconding 
debtors”;298 to now read: 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt, [unless the debt is a 
familial support debt]
299
 [or a debt owed to third parties in 
                                                     
292. 127 Wash. App. 926, 113 P.3d 1041 (2005).  
293. Id. at 928, 113 P.3d at 1042.  
294. Id. at 931, 113 P.3d at 1043 (citing In re Cave, 26 Wash. 213, 216, 66 P. 425, 426 (1901)); 
see also Brantley v. Brantley, 54 Wash. 2d 717, 344 P.3d 731 (1959), Bronson v. Syverson, 88 
Wash. 264, 272, 152 P. 1039, 1042 (1915). 
295. Britannia Holdings Ltd., 127 Wash. App. at 933, 113 P.3d at 1044.  
296. 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (holding that the federal Due Process Clause was violated when an 
indigent individual was imprisoned for failing to pay without a finding that he was able to pay); see 
also State v. Nason, 168 Wash. 2d 936, 948, 233 P.3d 848, 853 (2010) (holding that Spokane 
County’s “auto-jail policy,” wherein offenders were automatically imprisoned for failing to pay 
LFOs, violated federal due process because it did not require the court find that the defendant was 
able to pay).  
297. Britannia Holdings Ltd., 127 Wash. App. at 932, 113 P.3d at 1044.  
298. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
299. In re Cave, 26 Wash. 213, 216, 66 P. 425, 426 (1901) (emphasis added).  
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connection with familial support,]
300
 except in cases of 
absconding debtors [or in cases of debtors who are not 
determined to be absconding but fail to comply with an order of 
the court demanding payment of debt, as long as that court order 
is punitive rather than coercive,]
301
 [or coercive rather than 
punitive].
302
 
Setting aside the blaring inconsistencies, the very fact that judicial 
interpretation has substantially rewritten the provision is cause for 
concern. The constitutional drafting process is unlike any other rule 
promulgation in modern government.
303
 Constitutions serve as 
overarching documents defining the validity of all governmental actions. 
Failing to respect constitutional language and intent compromises the 
judicial process, both by compromising respect for judges and by 
undermining the certainty of individual liberty protections fundamental 
to Washington constitutional jurisprudence. Absent constitutional 
amendment, the Washington judiciary should respect the plain language 
and original intent of article I, section 17.  
So far, the judiciary has allowed article I, section 17 to be rendered 
null regarding an entire class of civil debts—incapacitating it to such an 
extent that most litigants challenging imprisonment for LFO 
nonpayment do not even cite the provision. However, the Court can 
remedy this injustice by embracing the sentiment and interpretation set 
forth during the constitutional convention and in the First Era of article I, 
section 17 jurisprudence. 
1.  Washington’s Modern Jurisprudence Has Nearly Nullified the 
Provision 
The current jurisprudence has rendered article I, section 17 a shell of 
                                                     
300. Brantley v. Brantley, 54 Wash. 2d 717, 721, 113 P.3d 731, 734 (1959); Decker v. Decker, 52 
Wash. 2d 456, 458, 326 P.2d 332, 333 (1958).  
301. Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 661–62, 30 P.2d 646, 649 (1934) (holding that a 
statute providing imprisonment did not violate article I, section 17 because it was punishing the 
defendant for violating the statute rather than coercing the defendant to pay the license fee); Colby 
v. Backus, 19 Wash. 347, 349, 53 P. 367, 367 (1898) (explaining that imprisonment for failing to 
pay costs cast upon a defendant as a penalty did not offend the constitution);.  
302. Britannia Holdings Ltd., 127 Wash. App. at. 931, 113 P.3d at 1043 (“It has long been 
settled . . . that coercive imprisonment for contumacious refusal to obey a lawful order to pay 
money is not imprisonment for debt.” (emphasis added)); State ex rel. Daly v. Snyder, 117 Wash. 
App. 602, 606, 72 P.3d 780, 781 (2003) (“A coercive sanction is justified only on the theory that it 
will induce a specific act that the court has the right to coerce . . . should it become clear that the 
civil sanction will not produce the desired result, the justification for the civil sanction disappears.”).  
303. See Bronson v. Syverson, 88 Wash. 264, 275, 152 P. 1039, 1043 (1915).  
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its former self. Although the provision facially allows imprisonment for 
debt only in cases of absconding debtors, courts have imprisoned many 
for failing to pay various debts, even without finding the individual was 
absconding—and even without finding the debtor fraudulently incurred 
the debt by never intending to pay it. In the most extreme example, 
article I, section 17 no longer protects non-absconding individuals from 
imprisonment for failing to pay civil debts.
304
 So long as a debt is court-
ordered and the defendant, in the judge’s opinion, willfully fails to pay, 
she can be imprisoned even if she is not absconding.
305
 
If willful non-payment is truly the touchstone for article I, section 17, 
then the provision provides no further protection than is required by the 
state Due Process Clause. The Due Process Clause protects individuals 
from imprisonment via contempt for failing to pay unless the court has 
first determined that the default was willful.
306
 Britannia Holdings 
imposes no further protections. The delegates cannot have intended 
article I, section 17 to essentially mirror the state’s Due Process Clause. 
“[A] constitutional protection cannot be bypassed by allowing it to exist 
in form but letting it have no effect in function.”307 In order for the 
provision to exist in both form and function, it must have been intended 
to provide additional protections for individuals imprisoned for unpaid 
civil debts. Thus, the current interpretation of article I, section 17 is 
impermissible. The most recent decisions are based on a 
misunderstanding of precedent and the provision itself. The Court must 
understand where its predecessors improperly diverged in order to 
remedy the current jurisprudence. Article I, section 17 cannot continue 
to exist in form but not substance. “The Constitution deals with 
substance, not shadows. Its inhibition was leveled at the thing, not the 
name . . . . If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of the enactment, 
                                                     
304. Britannia Holdings Ltd., 127 Wash. App. at 933, 113 P.3d at 1044 (holding that imprisoning 
defendants for failing to satisfy a court ordered judgment mandating payment to a private party did 
not constitute imprisonment for debt).  
305. Id. at 933, 113 P.3d at 1044 (requiring only that the court find the debtor is able but refuses 
to pay in order to imprison that debtor for contempt). Although this case is the most extreme 
example, it seems to be generally accepted as good law. Prominent Washington constitutional law 
scholars have cited the case as an uncontroverted interpretation of the provision. See, e.g., ROBERT 
F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 44 (2d ed. 2013). 
306. The United States Supreme Court issued this seminal holding in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 
U.S. 660 (1983). The Washington State Due Process Clause does not afford protections exceeding 
the federal Due Process Clause. In re Dyer, 143 Wash. 2d 384, 394, 20 P.3d 907, 912 (2001) (en 
banc) (“Washington’s Due Process Clause does not afford a broader due process protection than the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
307. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 660, 771 P.2d 711, 724 (1989). 
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its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and futile proceeding.”308 
2.  The Modern Cases Are Inconsistent with the Foundational 
Interpretation of Article I, Section 17 
The modern cases, employing the contempt-versus-civil-debt 
distinction, fail to respect the analytical framework derived from the 
foundational decisions in the First Era: (1) if the principal is a debt 
within article I, section 17, then (2) imprisonment for failing to pay a 
previously incurred debt is impermissible, but punishing fraudulent or 
criminal conduct that resulted in a debt is allowed.
309
 
Interestingly, the cases providing foundation for the contempt-versus-
civil-debt distinction did so through extraneous or alternative holdings. 
In Austin, the Court held that imprisonment for failing to pay the 
business and occupations tax did not violate the Constitution because 
taxes were not “debts” within the provision. The Court then set forth a 
second holding: Because the imprisonment was intended to punish the 
defendant for failing to comply with the ordinance rather than compel 
payment of the license tax, it did not constitute imprisonment for debt.
310
 
The Court could have limited its discussion to only one holding: Taxes 
are not “debts” within the provision. However, by endorsing a separate 
holding that alternatively characterizes the obligation as a debt and 
allows imprisonment without finding fraud, the Court adopted reasoning 
contrary to Milecke. Similarly, although the primary holding in Decker 
was that alimony is not a “debt” within article I, section 17—and the 
Court retroactively attempted to cabin the case to just this holding
311—
Decker has been cited for the proposition that imprisonment for 
contemptuous default, even absent a finding of fraud, does not offend 
the constitution.
312
 
One can dismiss the jurisprudential discrepancies if one accepts the 
holdings predicated on defining “debt” as the only holding in each of 
these cases, dismissing the extraneous contempt-versus-civil-debt 
                                                     
308. Id. at 655, 771 P.2d at 721 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 
116, 110 P. 1020, 1023 (1910)). 
309. See supra notes 235–54 and accompanying text.  
310. Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 655, 661–62, 30 P.2d 646, 649 (1934). 
311. Brantley v. Brantley, 54 Wash. 2d 717, 721, 344 P.3d 731, 734 (1959) (“It should be clear 
from our holding in the Decker case that . . . the significant question to be determined is whether the 
provision that the court seeks to enforce by contempt proceedings, regardless of the name given it, 
bears a reasonable relationship to the husband’s duty to support his wife and children. If it does, it 
does not fall within the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.”). 
312. State v. Barklind, 87 Wash. 2d 814, 820, 557 P.2d 314, 319 (1976). 
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discussions. However, subsequent courts have embraced the extraneous 
discussions expounded in these cases, holding contempt, even absent a 
finding of fraud, to be outside of the constitutional prohibition on 
imprisonment for debt.
313
 Apart from the determination of “willfulness” 
required by the Due Process Clause, courts no longer determine if a 
fraudulent or criminal act occurred.
314
 This doctrine, predicated on the 
contempt-versus-civil-debt distinction, has been recently heralded as 
well-established law.
315
 
Every so often, a court recognizes the inconsistencies and attempts to 
bring the doctrine back down to its basics. In Enloe, the court invalidated 
a statute providing imprisonment for failing to pay, explaining that the 
statute failed to imprison individuals for only fraudulent acts as required 
by Milecke and its progeny.
316
 The Court explained that the mere finding 
of intentionality is insufficient to satisfy the fraud requirement espoused 
by the early foundational cases.
317
 Similarly, the Washington State 
Supreme Court refused to imprison a man for taking his own car from a 
mechanic without paying.
318
 The Court explained: “Although it is 
acceptable to imprison for fraud, one cannot be imprisoned merely for 
failure to pay a debt.”319 Courts can recognize the fundamental 
wrongness embodied by the current jurisprudence, but it is up to litigants 
to give courts the tools to unify the doctrine by returning to the 
foundational interpretation of article I, section 17. 
3. Imprisonment for Failing to Pay Non-Fine LFOs Is Contrary to 
the Court’s Early Jurisprudence 
The foundational cases interpreting article I, section 17 provide a 
                                                     
313. State ex rel. Daly v. Snyder, 117 Wash. App. 602, 610, 72 P.3d 780, 783 (2003). The Court 
did not address fraud. Id. Instead, the Court predicated the validity of imprisoning the defendant for 
failing to pay child support on a nuanced distinction: 
“[E]nforcement of equitable orders through the use of contempt is permitted because a 
contempt order is an attempt by the court to compel the defendant to comply with the court’s 
prior, lawful, equitable order. It is not imprisonment for a debt, but rather imprisonment for 
refusing to comply with the court’s equitable order to do or not to do something.”  
Id.; see also Britannia Holdings Ltd. v. Greer, 127 Wash. App. 926, 933, 113 P.3d 1041, 1044 
(2005) (requiring only that the debtor be able to satisfy the debt to be imprisoned for default). 
314. See, e.g., Britannia Holdings Ltd., 127 Wash. App. at 933, 113 P.3d at 1044.  
315. Id. at 931, 113 P.3d at 1043 (“It has long been settled . . . that coercive imprisonment for 
contumacious refusal to obey a lawful order to pay money is not imprisonment for debt.”). 
316. 47 Wash. App. 165, 170–72, 734 P.2d 520, 523–24 (1987). 
317. Id. 
318. State v. Pike, 118 Wash. 2d 585, 826 P.2d 152 (1992). 
319. Id. at 595, 826 P.2d at 157. 
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simple test: (1) if the principal is a debt within the provision, then (2) 
imprisonment for failing to pay a previously incurred debt is 
impermissible, while punishing fraudulent or criminal conduct that 
resulted in a debt is permissible.
320
 Defendants cannot use article I, 
section 17 to avoid discipline for fraudulent and criminal acts merely 
because they resulted in debt.
321
 However, the plaintiffs cannot obliterate 
the constitutional protection by imprisoning individuals for failing to pay 
previous debts, or even for accruing those debts absent a finding of 
fraud.
322
 
Non-fine LFOs are “debts” within article I, section 17.323 
Furthermore, imprisonment for LFO default occurs well after the 
individual incurs the debt, constituting imprisonment for failing to pay a 
previously incurred debt. LFOs do not arise as a result of fraudulent or 
criminal act creating a debt in the way contemplated by Milecke. No 
finding of fraud is required when a defendant is imprisoned for 
default.
324
 LFOs do not operate as penalties, the nonpayment of which 
constitutes fraud—convicted felons pay their “penalties” in the form of 
fines and jail time. Non-fine LFOs are designed to reimburse the State 
and victims for monetary losses incurred due to the debtor’s bad actions 
and conviction. Were this practice in existence one hundred years ago, 
the Court would have surely declared it unconstitutional.
325
 Imprisoning 
individuals for failing to pay LFOs is contrary to the foundational 
doctrine interpreting article I, section 17 and should no longer be 
endorsed by Washington courts. 
                                                     
320. See supra notes 235–54 and accompanying text. 
321. See supra notes 235–54 and accompanying text. 
322. See supra notes 235–54 and accompanying text. 
323. See supra notes 146–86 and accompanying text.  
324. See, e.g., Britannia Holdings Ltd. v. Greer, 127 Wash. App. 926, 933, 113 P.3d 1041, 1044 
(2005) (requiring only that the debtor be able to satisfy the debt to be imprisoned for default).  
325. In Milecke, the court emphasized the difference between “unfortunate debtors” (protected 
from imprisonment) and “wrongdoers”—such as a man who “beats his neighbor, kills his ox, or 
girdles his fruit trees”—who could be imprisoned for his fraudulent actions. 52 Wash. 312, 316, 100 
P. 743, 745 (1909). Individuals who beat their neighbor, kill their ox, or girdle fruit trees serve their 
moral debt to society by paying fines and serving jail sentences. See id. LFOs are something else 
altogether. They are designed to fund the criminal justice system and recoup losses caused to 
victims; LFOs are not intended to punish: They primarily serve as a funding mechanism, levying a 
debt against those who participate in the criminal justice system. See supra notes 68–74 and 
accompanying text.  
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V.  THE STATUTORY SCHEME ENABLING IMPRISONMENT 
FOR FAILING TO PAY LFO’S IS EXPRESSLY CONTRARY 
TO WASHINGTON’S CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
Not only does imprisonment for LFO nonpayment violate article I, 
section 17, but the character of the statutes endorsing the practice 
compromises its legality. Statutory requirements allowing the practice 
defy the reasoning apparent in the foundational article I, section 17 
jurisprudence. Furthermore, the practical effects of LFO imprisonment 
fail to satisfy the statutory mandates. 
A.  The Statute’s Requirement That Contempt Must Be Remedial 
Contradicts the Fundamental Jurisprudence Endorsing Only 
Punishment for Criminal Intent 
Foundational jurisprudence distinguishes between punishing 
individuals for fraudulent conduct that resulted in debt and punishing 
individuals for failing to pay previously incurred debts.
326
 Early courts 
were hesitant to allow criminal or fraudulent conduct to go unpunished 
merely because it resulted in debt.
327
 Punishing fraudulent or criminal 
conduct resulting in debt was permitted, while coercing payment of 
previously incurred debts violated the Constitution. The Court endorsed 
only punitive imprisonment, rather than coercive imprisonment intended 
to remedy nonpayment. Even the more modern contempt-versus-civil-
debt distinction is predicated on a punitive theory distinguished from 
judicial coercion.
328
 It is constitutional to imprison LFO defaulters, not 
to coerce payment of the debt, but to punish disrespect for the court.
329
 
However, the statute allowing imprisonment for LFO nonpayment 
sets forth civil, remedial contempt.
330
 Remedial contempt requires 
imprisonment be aimed at remedying nonpayment—it must be 
coercive.
331
 Inversely, remedial contempt cannot be punitive.
332
 
                                                     
326. See supra notes 235–54 and accompanying text.  
327. In re Milecke, 52 Wash. at 316, 100 P. at 744–45 (1909).  
328. See supra notes 289–97 and accompanying text.  
329. See Austin v. City of Seattle, 176 Wash. 654, 661–62, 30 P.2d 646, 649 (1934) (finding an 
ordinance allowing imprisonment for failing to pay a fine fell outside of the purview of article I, 
section 7 because “[t]he misdemeanor consists in [sic] a refusal to obey the provisions of the 
ordinance, and the fine authorized to be imposed upon conviction is not intended as a payment of 
the license tax, but as a punishment for defying the commands of the ordinance”). 
330. Smith v. Whatcom Cnty. Dist. Ct., 147 Wash. 2d 98, 110, 52 P.3d 485, 492 (2002) 
(referencing WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.030 (2002)). 
331. State v. Nason, 146 Wash. App. 744, 757, 192 P.3d 386, 393 (2008), rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 168 Wash. 2d 936, 233 P.3d 848 (2010) (“The primary purpose of the civil contempt 
 
10 - King.docx (Do Not Delete) 11/13/2015  2:39 PM 
2015] IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT IN WASHINGTON 1393 
 
Imprisoning an individual to coerce payment is contrary to the 
constitutional doctrine regarding imprisonment for debt predicated on a 
theory of punishment, rejecting imprisonment characterized as judicial 
coercion.
333
 Imprisoning individuals for failing to pay LFOs either 
violates the remedial contempt statutes (it is not remedial as required by 
the statute because it is a penalty for violating a court order, as mandated 
by constitutional jurisprudence) or violates the constitutional 
jurisprudence (it is not a penalty as required by the Constitution because 
it is intended to coerce payment, as mandated by the remedial statutes). 
The Legislature cannot have it both ways. 
B.  The Current Practice of Imprisoning Individuals for LFO 
Nonpayment Is Not Remedial as Is Required by the Statute 
Along similar lines, imprisoning individuals for LFOs may not satisfy 
the remedial requirements of the statute at all. Civil contempt may only 
be used to the extent it is coercive or remedial in nature.
334
 However, 
there is little evidence the practice is actually remedying LFO 
nonpayment.
335
 In fact, numerous case studies suggest that imprisonment 
for LFO default exacerbates LFO non-payment problems.
336
 In some 
cases, the seemingly unsurmountable barrier posed by LFOs actually 
causes individuals to cease payments entirely.
337
 Furthermore, 
                                                     
power is to coerce a party to comply with an order or judgment.”). The Daly court provided further 
support for this notion when it stated: 
A coercive sanction is justified only on the theory that it will induce a specific act that the court 
has the right to coerce . . . . And should it become clear that the civil sanction will not produce 
the desired result, the justification for the civil sanction disappears. Further incarceration can 
be justified as a punishment for disobeying the court’s orders, but only after a criminal 
proceeding.  
State ex rel. Daly v. Snyder, 117 Wash. App. 602, 606, 72 P.3d 780, 781 (2003). 
332. Washington has separate statutes allowing for punitive contempt. These do not apply to LFO 
nonpayment because LFO nonpayment implicates remedial contempt. Smith, 147 Wash. 2d at 110, 
52 P.3d at 492 (referencing WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.030). 
333. This is probably where the incongruity between opinions such as Britannia Holdings and 
Austin arise. The contempt-versus-civil-debt distinction was promulgated before the court had to 
ensure compliance with remedial contempt statutes. Where the Austin Court explained that 
individuals can be imprisoned to punish but not to compel debt satisfaction, Austin, 176 Wash. 654, 
30 P.2d 646, the Britannia Holdings Court held that individuals can be imprisoned only to compel 
payment, while punishing failing to pay would be improper, Britannia Holdings Ltd. v. Greer, 127 
Wash. App. 926, 113 P.3d 1041 (2005). 
334. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.030(2)(a) (2014) (“The imprisonment [for contempt of court] may 
extend only so long as it serves a coercive purpose.”). 
335. See supra notes 117–39 and accompanying text. 
336. Id. 
337. Id. 
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individuals who are imprisoned cannot make payments while 
incarcerated.
338
 Since imprisonment for failing to pay LFOs is probably 
not effectively coercing individuals to satisfy their debts, the practice 
does not satisfy the remedial requirements of civil contempt. 
CONCLUSION 
Imprisonment for failing to pay LFOs in Washington is a practice 
inviting institutional challenge. However, modern litigants are not 
attacking the system itself. The Washington judiciary has, over time, 
substantially abrogated article I, section 17. But the current Court need 
not continue down this troublesome path. With a thorough 
understanding of Washington’s constitutional jurisprudence, a 
thoughtful litigant can explain where past interpretations of article I, 
section 17 have impermissibly diverged and present the Court with the 
tools it needs to breathe new life into a forgotten protection. A thorough 
understanding of article I, section 17’s interpretational evolution reveals 
that the foundational jurisprudence contradicts the current statutory 
scheme allowing imprisonment for debt. Washington’s Constitution 
prohibits imprisonment for failing to pay LFOs and the practice must be 
challenged systemically. 
 
                                                     
338. Id. 
